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Summary  findings
Hoekman  and Mavroidis explore options for Central  agreements  with the European Union. That is, the
and Eastern  European (CEE)  governments  to make  European Commission  could be asked to apply
competition law enforcement more sensitive  to trade and  competition policy  criteria in antidumping investigations
investment  policy, thereby supporting liberal trade  against  products originating in CEE countries, ensuring
policy.  that there is a threat to competition, not just a threat to a
The competition laws of these countries tend to  Europen  Union competitor. This treatment could be
resemble  European Union (EU)  competition disciplines  sought informally  during the transitional period.
(Articles  85-86 of the Treaty of Rome), but give  Generally, since  the CEE countries have  adopted
competition  authorities great scope for discrction in  competition  legislation  comparable  to that of the
interpreting the relevant statutes.  Much can be donc  European Union, it seems  safe to assume that if they
through appropriate wording of criteria and  enforce their competition laws vigorously,  EU-consistent
implementation  guidelines  within the framework of  minimum  standards  will be respected.
existing  legislation  to subject trade policy  to competition-  Until the association  agreements are fully
policy  scrutiny.  implemented,  it is important to reduce to a minimum the
A liberal trade policy  and active enforcement  of  risk of being treated as an 'unfair trader." Safeguard
competition  laws will be crucial not only for national  actions will remain possible  until EU membership  has
welfare,  but also for eliminating  the threat of contingent  been attained.  But safeguard protection is more difficult
protection by EU firms. When CEE countries face  to scek and obtain if there is only  a weak casc for arguing
antidumping  threats or actions from EU countries,  that Central and Eastern European firms are benefiting
Hoekman and Mavroidis suggest  that they seek a link  from trade barriers, state aids, or various govemment-
between competition  law enforcement  and antidumping  maintained entry barriers.
investigations  in the context of the association
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Six  Central  and Eastern  European  (CEE)  countries-Bulgaria,  the Czech  Republic,  Hungary,
Poland,  Romania,  and the Slovak  Republic-have  negotiated  far-reaching  Association  Agreements  with
the European  Union  (EU), so-called  Europe  Agreements. These  Agreements  will result  in free trade in
goods,  and include  commitments  by the CEE countries  to adopt many  of the disciplines  of the Treaty  of
Rome. Tis  paper focuses  on one aspect  of the Europe  Agreemnents:  competition  policy, and does so
from the perspective  of the trade policy  stance  of the CEE countries. It explores  possible  institutional
mechanisms  that  could  be implemented  by CEE  govermnents  with a view to increasing  the sensitivity  of
competition  law enforcement  to trade and investment  policy.
The objective  of competition  policy in most jurisdictions  tends to be efficient  resource
allocation,  and thereby  the maximization  of national  welfare. Governments  pursue  trade policies  for a
variety  of reasons, of which efficiency  is usually  not one.  An active  trade policy  redistributes  income
between segments  of the population  by protecting  specific industries  and the factors of production
employed  there, and usually  does so in an inefficient  manner.  Trade policy is consequently  often
inconsistent  with the objectives  underlying  competition  policy. The way this inconsistency  is frequently
put is that competition law aims at protecting competition (and thus economic efficiency), while trade
policy aims at protecting competitors (or factors of production).  The issue facing governments is to
ensure that competion  prevails.  This requires the design of institutional  mechanisms  that allow
governments  to explicitly  consider  the competition  implications  of particular  trade  or investment  policies.
lhe Europe  Agreements  require that the CEE counties adopt the basic competition  mles
of the EU for practices  that affect  trade between  the EU and each Central  and East European  country.
These  rules relate  to agreements  between  fms  restricting  compettion,  abuse  of dominant  position,  the
behavior  of  public  undertalkngs  (state-owned  firms)  and  competition-distorting  state  aids  (Articles  85, 86,
90 and 92 of the EEC Treaty  respectively). Thus, competition  policy  is defined  widely  to include  the
behavior  of govermnents  as well as of firms.  Almost all the CEE countries  have passed  competition
legislation  and  allocated  the  responsibility  for enforcing  their  competition  rules. There  are inconsistencies
with EU language  and implementation  criteriatguidelines,  some of them substantial,  but the thrust of
existing  provisions  is certainly  pro-competitive.
Competition  authorities  in the CEE countries  have been  given a relatively  broad mandate
to idetify  the costs of government  policies  and actions  that restrict  competition. Trade policy is an
obvious  area that should  be given priority in this connection. Competition  offices  have two ways of
'internalizing'  trade policy. The first is to oppose-trade  policies  that excessively  harm competition  on
the domestic  market;  the second  is to countervail  the anticompetitive  effect  of trade policy  on an expost
basis. The  first, 'direct' approach  has been  actively  pursued  by a mimber  of the CEE competition  offices.
In this they coripare  well to competition  offices  in OECD counL!ies.  By commenting  on or opposing
suggested  or existing  trade policies,  the competition  offices  en.-ire that  the economy-wide  implications
of sectoral  policies/lobbying  are recognized  and discussed. The main power of competition  offices  is,
however,  of an ex  post nature. Active  enforcement,  wih guidelines  that clearly  specify  that  trade  policy
will be an important consideration-  in  the implerienting competition  laws, will help bolster the
effectiveness  of ex ante opposition  to policy  proposals  that restrict access  to markets.
A number  of actions  are identified  through  which competition  law enforcement  might be
strengthened  and be made even  more sensitive  to trade policy.  The legislative  possibility  for anitrust
agencies  in the CEE  countries  to act ea offico does not appear  to have  been  fully  exploited,  although  this
may largely be the result of the process of the  asition  towards private ownership  and a marketeconomy.  The development of detailed guidelines would help both reduce uncertainty regarding the
priorities given  by the competition  authorities to types of competition-reducing  practices, and clarify what
practices will not be pursued.  One connon  denominator in the legislation of all CEE countries is the
wide discretion that the agencies entrusted with the enforcement of competition laws enjoy.  This can
have a negative side, in the sense that a number of desirableper se prohibitions simply do not exist.  An
offsetting, positive  counterpart is  that  if  discrotion  is  exercised  in  a  pro-competition way,  the
"jurisprudence"  created  in  this  field  could  further  promote  the  goals  of  the  competition  laws.
Incorporation of the trade policy stance pertaining to an industry should explicitly be taken into account
when defining the relevant market in the enforcement of antitrust.  Guidelines to-this effect should also
be published.  Whenever market shares are defined as a threshold (i.e in the definition of dominant
positions) they should be linked to market contestability considerations-i.e.,  explicit public recognition
that what matters is market power.  It would prove very useful for the evolution of the competition
philosophy in the CEE countries, and at the same tine  enhance transparency, if competent agencies were
to publish the reasoning underlying their decisions.
Despite  their agreement  to adopt EU-compatible  competition disciplines, and despite the fact
that free trade and freedom of investment will be achieved within ten years, there is no provision in the
Europe Agireements  specifying that antidumping will be phased out.  Continued threats of contingent
protection on the part of the EU implies that CEEC firms will face different standards than their EU
competitors.  EU firms will be permitted to engage in price discrimination or sell below cost on the EU
market, whereas CEE firms wll  be constrained in pursuing such a strategy by the existence of EU
antidumping procedures.  A review of experience that has been obuined  with attempts to  abolish
antidumping in the context of regional integration agreements suggests that there are at least three
necessary conditions for the abolition of contingent  protection:  (1) free trade and freedom of investment;
(2) disciplines on the ability of governments to assist firms and industries located on their territory; and
(3) the existence and enforcement of competition (antitrust) legislation.  Although these conditions will
to a very great extent be satisfied for intra EU-CEE flows, the antidumping option was retained.
An  avenue that  could be  further  explored during  the  transition  phase  towards  full
implementation of the Europe Agreements is to establish a link between antidumping and antitrust in
instances where CEE countries are facing antidumping  threats or actions on the part of the EU.  The EC
Commission could be asked to apply comnetition policy criteria in antidunping  investigations against
products originating in CEE countries, ensuring that there is a threat to competition, not just a threat to
an EU competitor.  This could be sought on an informal basis during the transitional period.  Clearly,
the first best strategy for CEE countries is to seek the elimination of antidumping once the Europe
Agreement  have been fully implemented. If it proves to be impossible to obtain agreement to phase out
antidumping, a second-best  policy could be to formalize the link between competition law enforcement
and antidumping investigations.  More generally, since the CEE countries have adopted legislation
comparable to  that  of the EU  in  the competition field.  one can assume that  if they enforce their
competition laws vigorously, EU-consistent minimum standards will be respected. This may effectively
raise the threshold for EU import-competing  industries  seeking antidumping  relief. Vigorous enforcement
of competition disciplines in service industries, especially distribution-related, may further help reduce
the potential for EU firms to seek contingent protection.L Introduction
Six  Central  and  Eastern  European  (CEE)  countries-Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,
Poland,  Romania,  and the Slovak  Republic-have  negotiated  far-reaching  Association  Agreements  with
the European  Union  (EU), so-called  Europe  Agreements. These  Agreements  will result in free trade in
goods,  and include  commitments  by the CEE countries  to adopt  many  of the disciplines  of the Treaty  of
Rome. This  paper  focuses  on one aspect  of the Europe  Agreements:  competition  policy. It does  so from
the perspective  of international  trade  policy,  and  from  the perspective  of the CEE countries.  iThe primary
goal of the paper is to explore  possible  institutional  mechanisms  that could be implemented  by CEE
governments  with a view to  increasing  the sensitivity  of conpetiti6n law enforcement  to trade and
investment  policy.
The plan  of the paper is as follows. We start in Section  II with a brief general  discussion
of the linkages  between  trade and competition  policies. This is followed  by a short review  of the curent
stam of knowledge  regarding  'best practices' in the area of competition  policy and the experience  of
market  economies  in implementing  such  policies. Section  III summarizes  the  of the Europe
Agreements  in the area  of coihpetition  policy. Section  IV provides  an overview  of existing  competition
fegislation  and instimttions  in the six CEE countries,  drawing  upon a more detailed  country-by-country
summary of current laws contained  in,Appendix 2.  Almost all the CEE-  cbuntries bave passed
-competion  legislation and allocated the responsibility for enforcing their competition rules. Theiy  have
ieeived substantial  technical  assistance  from OECD  members  in tiis connection)  Section  V discusses
a number  of institutonal  options  that would  allow competition  aspects  of trade policy  decisions  to be
taken  mto  consideration  by administering  authories and  goverments. Three  situations  are  distinguished:
(1) the transitional period before the entry into force of the Europe Agreement;,  (2) the period during
which  the Europe  Agreement  applies;  and (3)'eventual  accession  to the EU.  Section  VI concludes.
II. Trade and Comeition  Policies:  Basic Issues.
National  competition  policy  cnm  be defined  as the set  of rules and disciplines  maintained  by
governments  relating  either to agreements  between  frms that restrict competition-  or to the abuse  of a
dominant  position  (including  attempts  to create a dominant  position  through  merger). The underlying
objective of competition  policy in most jurisdictiois tends to be efficient resource allocation, and thereby
'For example,  the Antitrust  Division  of the United  States  Justice  Department  and the Federal  Trade
Commission  received  a $7.2 million  grant  from USAID  to provide  tecnical assistance  to the six CEECs  in
1991  (BNA,  Antitrust  and Trade Regulation  Report,  May 30, 1991, no. 1518,  p. 761).  Contacts  betwe  the
CEE  counties and the EC Commisson  (DG-IV),  EU Member  State  enforcement  agencies nd the OECD
Secetariat have been intense.
1the maximization of national welfare.2  Most competition laws attempt to attain this  objective by
prohibiting the abuse of dominant positions (either through prohibition or  through regulation), and
forbidding various kinds of competition-restricting agreements between competitors.  The focus of
competition laws is on competition, reflecting the belief-which  is extensively supported by empirical
evidence-that vigorous competition is frequently the best way to  foster economic efficiency.  Many
jurisdictions recognize that specific agreements between firms that may reduce competition could be
efficiency enhancing, and make allowance for such agreements.  However, the burden of proof in such
instances is usually upon the participants in such arrangements.
The objectives underlying trade policy contrast starkly with those  of competition laws.
Governments pursue trade policies for a variety of reasons, including as a means to raise revenue, to
protect specific industries (whether 'infant',  'senile' or other), to shift the terms of trade, to attain certain
foreign policy or security goals, or simply to restrict the consumption of specific goods.  Whatever the
underlying objective, an active trade policy redistributes income between segments of the population by
protecting specific industries and the factors of production employed there, and usually does so in an
inefficient manner.  Trade policy is  consequently often inconsistent with the objectives underlying
competition policy.  The way this  inconsistency is frequently put  is that competition law  aims at
protecting compeation (and thus economic efficiency), while trade policy aims at protecting competitors
(or factors of production).  The issue facing govemments is to ensure that competition prevails. This
requires the  design of  institutional mechanisms that  allow governments to  explicitly consider the
competition implications of particular trade or investment policies.
The more restrictive the trade/investmenr regime, the more important competition policy
becomes to reduce the inevitable negative welfare consequences of the reduction in competition that
results from restricting the contestability of markets.  From an economic (efficiency) perspective, using
competition policy to attempt to offset the competitive distortions created by an active trade policy is of
course an exercise in the second best, and may not be welfare enhancing.  A preferable policy is to
minimize the extent to which trade policy reduces the contestability of markets in the first plae.  Thus,
a liberal external policy stance is a cheap and effective cowmpetition  policy.  Competition from imports
is a very important  source  of discipline  upon the behavior  of firms operating  in a market.3  This  iS the
2 However,  other  objecives may also be pursued. Thus, for examle, the competition  law of the United
iCngdom  contains  a broadly  defined  public intmest  objecive that, among  other things, allows  for 'm  g
avd promoting  the baanced distribution  of industry  and employment'  (Hay, 1993,  p.3).
3 This is one of the basic principles  of international  trade theory, one that applies  to both the traditional  setting
of competitive  markets  and in the more recent literature  that allows for imerfect  ompetition. For empirical
studies  confirming  the role of import  competition  as a soure of marikt discipline  in imperfecy competitive
markets  (reducig price-cost  magins), see Levinsobn  (1993)  and Jacquemin  and Sapir (1988).
2case  in particular  for the CEE  countries,  given  the highly  concentrated  industrial  structures  inherited  from
the past.  However,  while  a free trade stance  greatly reduces  the scope  of the task facing  competition
authorities,  it does not imply that the need for competition  rules disappear. Many products  are non-
tradable  (e.g., many  services),  or, even  if tradable,  competition  may  be limited  to local  markets  for other
reasons.4  Free tade must therefore  be complemented  by the freedom  of entry, including  the possibility
to contest  markets  through  foreign  direct investment. Even  then, certain  products  may be produced  by
(natural)  monopolies,  by firms with global market power, or by firms where natural or 'unnatural'
(governent-made) barriers  to entry  restrict contestability.  And, the more open are markets  to foreign
products,  the greater the potential  vulnerability  to anti-competitive  practices  of foreign  monopolists  or
cartels.  In all such cases  competition  rules should  apply.
In instances  where  sovereign  states  have concluded  economic  integration  agreements,  the
reach of competition  policy  may be extended  to include  the behavior  of governments  as well as firms.
Thus, in the case of the EU, competition  policy  disciplines  also pertain  to public  monopolies  and state-
owned  enterprises,  and governments  are restricted  in their ability to subsidize  firms located in their
territory  insofar  as this affects  trade between  Member  States. It is important  to realize that in the EU
cont-extwhere  the ultimate  goal is the realization  of a common  market-competition  disciplines  are
intended  not only to enhance  efficiency,  but also serve  as another  instument through  which  to attain  the
integration  objective. The goal  is to ensure  that the removal  of trade  barriers is not nullified  by actions
on the part of firms or governments  to maintain  or recreae market segmentation. The 'trade effect'
criterion  included  in the Treaty  of Rome's  competition  policy  disciplines  inplies that in the EU conxt
competition  rules are a complememt  to the internal  trade policy  of the EU, i.e., free trade. 5
The CEE countries  have  signed  far-reaching  association  agreements  with the EU that imply
a free tade,  free foreign direct investnent stance vis-a-vis the EU will exist once the various transitional
periods  have  ended. Trade  agreements  have  also been  negotated  with the EFTA  countries,  and between
the CEE countries  themselves  (the  Centrl European  Free Trade  Association).  While  the associated  trade
llberalization  reduces  the need  for an active  competition  policy  stance,  it by no means  makes  competition
law enforcement  redundant. For one, there is the transition  period during which  trade or inrvestment
barriers  remain  high for some  sectors. More importantly,  account  needs  to be taken of the policy  stance
vis-a-vis  the rest of the world, of the various  saftguard  mechanims -Duilt  into the EAs that allow for
4Retail  distributio is an often  mentioned  example  in this connection.
5 See, e.g., Ehlermann  (1992)  or Wheatheril  and  Beaumont  (1993). In  the case  of the EU,  competition  policy
acts as a discipline  on firms that operate  in an environment  of free trade. Thus, in principle  no conflict  arises
between  competition  and trade policy  in the EU context, dtere  no longer  being  a trade  policy affecting  intra-area
tansactions.
3possible  intervention  to support  domestic  industries,  of the fact  that  some  markets  are difficult  to contest
by foreign  fums, and  of the actions  of other parts of the government  that may restrain  competition.
Implementing  Institutions,  Cnteria  and Procedures
The presumption  underlying  competitioLI  policies  is generally that vigorous  competition
between  firms in an industry  will foster efficiency. However,  competition  per se will not necessarily
ensure efficient outcomes.  Much depends on  the kind of  competition  that finns  engage in, or
alternatively, on the objectives uiderlying agreements between firms in  an industry that reduce
competition  between  them. Certain  type of agreements  between  finns E iy be welfare  enhancing  for the
nation  as a whole. Thus, agreements  to form an export cartel may allow a domestic  industry  to raise
prices on export markets and improve the country's terms of trade and welfare.  Cooperation between
firns  may  also  lead  to  dynanic  benefits,  e.g.,  research  joint  ventures  or  agreements  on  the
development/use of commnon  standards allowing positive network externalities to be  realized.  Most
competition laws recognize that some agreements between competitors that appear to be competition-
reducing may in fact not reduce competition, or, even if limiting competition, may be welfare increasing.
As a result a disction  is generally made betweenperse  rules and condonalprohibitions.  The former
unconditionally  prohibit certain forms of behavior (agrements).  The latter prohibit certain types of
cooperation (collusion) in principle, but may permit their existence if the firm(s) involved can convince
the competition authonties  that the agreement is welfare enhancing.6  Space constraints prohibit any
detailed  discussion of competition law dteory and principlesY What follows is limited to a number of
issues that are of particular significance for the CEE countries.
A first issue is to determine what types of agreements/behavior should be subject to per se
rules.  There are only a limited number of competition-reducing agreements between frms  that can be
rejected on an a priori basis (assuming the objective is efficiency), of which price fixing and agreements
with similar effects are the most important. 8 Theory suggests these types of arrangements should be
subject to per se prohibition, and in most jurisdictions they are.  A strong political economy argument
6  In practice,  two approaches  can be followed  in this regard, of which the mle of reason (pursued  in the U.S.)
is one.  The  rule of reason is based on a case-by-case  analysis  of the efects of specific  situaions. The other
approach  (followed  by the EU) is to exempt  either specific  agreements  (along  U.S. lines)  or generic  ypes of
cooperatve  venres.
'T he literae  on competition  policy, both economic  and legal, is huge.  See Hay (1993)  for a survey  of
cunTm conomic thinking;  Boner  and Krueger  (1991)  for a summary  of the practices  of ten coUnties  as well as
the EU.
'Emples  of the latter include  production  (output)  sharig,  market allocation,  exclusionary  practices  and the
excnge  of information  between  compedtors  on variables  such as cost  and output.
4can be made for a restrictive  approach  to per se rules in the CEE context. Firms need to have the
maximum  amount  of flexibility  to compete  in whatever  way they see appropriate  to their situation.
Insofar  as there is some  uncertainty  regarding  the legal  and institutional  environment  in an economy  in
transition,  firms may  need  to be 'creative' in terms of their contractual  arrangements.
The majority  of countries  with  active  antitrust  enforcement  identify  three types  of practices
that may be prohibited:  competition-reducing  practices  or arrangements  between  firms; the abuse  of a
dominant  position;  and the establishment  of a dominant  position. Important  in this context  are not so
much  the specific  legislated  rules,  but the criteria  that  apply  when  implementing  the law. For example,
in the context  of an investigation  into  abuse  of a dominant  position,  the criteria  include  those  for defining
the product  and geographical  scope of the market, the threshold  of necessary  market power, and the
methods  used  to determine  the feasibility  of entry. Experience  reveals  that the effect  and operation  of
competition  laws  very much  depends  on the implementing  rules that are applied.
A final  issue  relates  to the design  of the institutional  mechanisms  for enforcing  competition
rules.  This includes  the allocation  of responsibility  for enforcing  competition  law to an entity, its
relationship  to the govermnent  and legislature,  its powers  of investigation  and  sanction,  its financing  and
staffing, and the mechanisms  to ensure transparency  and consistency,  including  the availability  of an
oversight  or appeals  body (the courts  or a tribunal).
The approaches  taken by OECD  countries  towards  competition  law and policy  are quite
diverse, reflecting  in part differences  in economic  philosophy,  and in part differences  in size and
openness.  A number of lessons can be drawn from both economic theory and experience:9
S  The focus of the rules and enforcement  efforts should  be on all sectors,  including
services,  and should  center  on the effects  of agreements  between  firms, not  on their form. The basis  for
intervening  should be market power, not dominance  (as measured,  e.g., by market shares).  A key
criterion in investigating  whether an arrangement  between firms or  an action of a firm violates
competition  nrles should  be the ease of entry into, and exit from, the industry. Contestability  is what
matters.
*  The mnumber  of per se prohibitions  should  be small and focus on horizontal,  price-
fixing arrangeme.  Disciplines  on vertical  restraints  should  be subject  to a well-defined  contestability
constraint,  i.e., a necessary  condition  for pursuing  vertical  restraints  is significant  entry barriers.
9 Again,  what follows  draws  upon a large literature. For recent, much  more  comprehensive  discussions  of
competition rules and experience, see Boner and Krueger (1991), Hay (1993), Neven et al (1993), and the
annual  reports  of the OECD  Committee  on Competition  Law  and Policy.
5*  Competition  rules should provide ex post disciplines  on trade policy-created  or
supported  abuse  of market  power,  ideally  including  a mandate  for competition  authorities  to recommend
the removal/reduction  of trade barriers and to be consulted  in the trade policy formation  process.
*  The  criteria  that  are used in investigations  should  be spelled  out clearly  in guidelines.
De minimis  rules should  be included. Firms should  face  as little  uncertainty  regarding  potential  liability
as is possible. Detailed  reports  of investigations  should  be published. Procedures  should  be transparent.
*  Civil parties  should  be able to sue persons  (natural  and legal)  deemed  to engage  in
behavior violating the competition  rules.  Enforcement  authorities  should have the power to levy
substantial  fines and award  damages.
*  Both  investigating  procedures  and substantive  reasoning  should  be subject  to review
by an appeals  body that is independent  of the enforcement  authority.
*  An independcnt  body  should  exist  with  the mandate  to analyze  and publicize  the costs
and benefits to the economy  of government  created or maintained  barriers to entry in individual
industries.
III.  The Europe Agreements'  Competition Rules
The Europe  Agreements  (EAs) foresee  in the application  of the basic competition  rules of
the EU by the associated  countries  to practices  that affect  trade  between  the EU and each  Central  and East
European  country.  The rules relate to agreements  between firms restricting  competition,  abuse of
dominant  position,  the behavior  of public  undertaldngs  (state-awned  firns) and competition-distorting
state aids (Articles  85, 86, 90 and 92 of the EEC Treaty respectively). Thus, competition  policy is
defined  widely  to include  the behavior  of governments  as well as of firms.  Implementng  rules are to
be adopted  by the Association  Council  on a consensus  basis within  three years  of the entry into force  of
the Agreements.  "'
Each Europe  Agreement  must be ratified by 13 national  parliaments  plus the European
Parliament-because  the agreements  include issues on which the Commission  does not have exclusive
competence. So as to accelerate  the implementation  of the trade  and trade-related  provisions  of the EAs,
interim  agreement were  signed  that  entered  into force on March 1, 1992  for the so-called  Visegrad  four
(Hungary,  Poland,  and the Czech  and Slovak  Republics),  May 1, 1993  for Romania  and Decmber 31,
0 For  a general  review  of reions  between  the EU and  the CEECs,  see  Kennedy  and Webb  (1993).  Pohl  and
Sorsa  (1993)  provide  a summary  of the EAs, and Mastopasqua  and Rolli (1994)  analyze  the economic  impact
of the trade components  of the agrement.
61993  for Bulgaria. They will remain in force  until the EAs are ratified."  As competition  policy is a
EU competence,  it is covered  by the interim  agreements. The interim  agreements  revise the language
of the EAs as regards the detennination  of implementing  rules by requiring  that these be adopLed  by
decision  within three years of the entry into force of the interim agreements  by the Joint Conunittee
(established  under  the earlier Cooperation  Agrements that had been negotiated  with Hungary,  Poland
and the Czech and Slovak Republics). Sub-committees  for competition  have been established  under
auspices  of the Joint  Committees. It has been  agreed  that cooperation  between  the EU and CEE antitrust
authorities  is to follow  the 1986  OECD  Council  Recommendation  dealing  with  cooperation  on restrictive
business  practices  affecting  international  trade, and Article  V of the agreement  between  the EU and the
U.S. regarding  the application  of their competition  laws ('positive  comity').' 2
The  notion  of 'positive  comity'  appears  alongside  'traditional'  comity  in the September  1991
cooperation  agreement  in antitrust  between  the EU and the U.S.1 3 According  to the traditional  comity
principle,  sovereign  states will consider important  interests of other states when exercising  their own
jurisdiction  (Art.VI  of the agreement).' 4 'Positive  comity' shifts  the initiative  to the state  whose  interests
are affected,  which  is given  the legal  option  of requesting  another  state  to initiate  appropriate  enforcement
proceedings  if this could address  the complaining  country's concerns  (Art.V of the agreement). While
it clcarly  goes beyond the traditional  principle  that is embodied  in the OECD Recommendations,  the
ultimate  decision  renains at the discretion  of the state asked  to act.  As discussed  further  below, the
ntion  of positive  comity could  be exploited  further  in the trade-competition  policy  context.?s
"As of end-1993  only  the agreements  with  Poland  and  Hungary  had  been  ratified. The  respective  Association
Councils  met  in early  March  1994  for the first  time.
12  OECD  (1994,  pp. 14-15).  During  1993  several  meetings  took  place  between  CEEC  officials  and  the EC
Commission  wherc issues  relating  to the implementation  of competition  policy  were discssed.  These  meetings
should  facilitate  agreement  on formal  implementation  rules by the Joint Committees. Presumably  these  will
simply  be adopted  by the Association  Council  once the relevant  EAs  have been  ratified. DG-IV  of the
Commission  has interacted  with the CEECs  with a view to harnonizing antitrust  policies  (not laws).
"See,  e.g., Ham (1993)  for a discussion.
14  The 1986  OECD  Recommendation,  which replaced  the 1979  Re  daion  and purports  to strengthen
intemnational  cooperation  in this field, encourages  OECD  members  to give  effect to the principle  of tradidonal
comity.
" France  has challenged  the Commission's  competence  to conclude  this agreement,  which  has been
characteized as administrative  by the Commission  and thus falling  within  its sphere of competence. The
outcome  of the case is still pending,  although  the Advocate  General  has already  pronounced  in favor of France's
arguments. See Case C-327/91,  French Republic  vs. Commission. Even if France  wins its case  before the
European  Court of Justice,  the 'positive  comity'  prnciple can still apply  in the EA context as these  have been
legally  concluded  by the competent  EC organs.
7Appendix 1 reproduces the relevant Articles pertaining to competition policy from the EA
with Hungary.  The other EAs contain virually identical language."  As far as disciplines on enterprise
behavior are concerned, the basic rules of the Treaty of Rome have been included. That is, practices that
restrict or distort competition and abuses of domiinant  positions (in either the EU or the relevant CEE
country); insofar  as they affect trade,  are to be  assessed on the basis  of criteria arising from  the
application of Articles 85 and 86 EEC.  This wording implies that the case law that has been built up in
the last 45 years in the EU applies.  Art.85 EEC prohibits agreements and concerted practices-both tacit
and explicit, whether enforceable or not-that  restrict or distort competition in the common.  market and
may affect trade between EU member states.  Both horizontal and vertical'restraints are covered.  The
EU applies a  version of the 'effects'  doctrine: the focus is on distortions of competition within the
commaunity,  independent of the national origin of the firms involved.  Implementation  -of the conduct
withiix  the EU is necessary to assert jurisdiction.'7 Effects on trade may be potential; indirect as well
as direct, and involve stimulating as well as restricting  trade (e.g., through the use of cross-subsidization).
A de 1mimi1s  rule has been established by the EC Commission under which finns with relevant market
shares below 5 percent and aggregate annual turnover of less than ECU 200 million are exempted from
'the reach of competition disciplines.  Art. 85:3 EEC offers the possibility of exemptions from the general
prhibition  on competition distorting agreements if it can be shown that the agreement is in the public
interest."8 Certain types of agreements have bcen granted 'block'  exemptions, including those relating
to  standardization and R&D cooperation, exclusive distribution (as long -as pirallel  imports remain
feasible),.exclusive purchasing and automobile distribution and servicing.  The Commission can self-
initiate investigations  or respond to complaints  and has the power to  -demand information and levy fines
for noi-compliance.
Article 86 EEC prohibits abuse of a dominant position.  Dominance is determLined  on the
basis of the relevant product and geographic markets.  Dominance rnay relatd to the common market as
a whole or 'a  substantial part thereof."  No quantitative criteria are mentioned in.Art. 86 regarding the
interpretation of substantial, or the market share (or other indicators) requpired  for dominance. Abuse is
also  left undefined.  Art.86  contains an illustrative list  of abuses,  including unfair trading,  price
discrimnation,  tieins  or bundling, and restricting output or access to ma4ets.
6 The agreements  do have minor differn  as they  were negotiated  independenly.
'7  The 'pure' effects  doctrine is therefore  not accepted. See van Gerven (1989).
'Necessary conditions  are:  (1) that the agreement  contributes  to improving  the production  or distribution  of
goods  or to promoting  technological  or economic  progress,  while  allowing  consumers  a fair share of the
resulting  benefit;  (2) the agreement  is indispensable  to achieve  this benefit;  and (3) it does eliminate  competition
in respect  of a substantial  part of the industry  involved.
8There are sorne key differences between the rules that apply under the EAs and those that
apply to EU or EEA Member States.  First, the EAs do not reproduce Art.85:3 EEC and thus do not
make any allowance tor the granting of exemptions.  Presumably this will be one of the matters to be
addressed by the Association Councii/Joint Committee in developing implementation rules.  Until then,
exemptions granted  by national CEE competition offices  do not have to be recognized by the EU (see also
Bourgeois, 1993). Second, the EAs do not contain disciplines relating to mergers, and the Commission
will presumably apply the relevant regulation unilaterally.9  Third, they do not spell out what bodies
are responsible for enforcement of EA disciplines, tlh  criteria for allocating responsibility, and the
options for appeal.  These are matters that are left for the Association Council/Joint Conmmittee  to
determine.
Public undertakings and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights have been granted
(e.g., monopolies), are to be subject to the principles of Article 90 EEC within three years of the entry
into force of the association agreement.  Art. 90 requires nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality
and behavior consistent with the other competition principles and rules of the EU, including Articles 85-
86 and 92, insofar as the application of these rules do not impede the realization of the tasks assigned to
the public undertaing.  State monopolies of a commercial character are to be adjusted within five years
to ensure nondiscriminaiion regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed
between EU and CEE country nationals (this is analogous to Article 37 EEC).
Turning to disciplines on state aids, until implemendng rules are adopted, GATT rles  with
respect to countervailing  of subsidies wil  apply. State-aid, compatible with EU rules for disadvantaged
regions (Article 92.3(a) Treaty of Rome), can be applied to the entire territories of the associated states
during the first five years.  Such regional aid may be given by EU governments to regions in their
countries with per  capita incomes that  are substantially below average,  or to  areas where there  is
significant unemployment.  The low level of per  capita incomes in  the Central and East European
countries in comparison  to those of EU states should ensure that non-industry-specific  ste  aids will be
unconstrained in the medium term.  The agreements also provide for enhanced transparency of state aids.
The adequacy of these provisions are to be determined by the Association Council.  State aids to
agriculture and fishenes are excluded from competition policy disciplines, and separate rules are to be
implemented  bY  the Association  Council within three years for the steel sector. The latter are to be based
"The  1989  merger  regulon  gives the Commission  the right to vet mergers  with a Communnity  dimension  for
tbeir impact  on competition.  Mergers  affected  are those  where the firms involved  have a global  turnover  of at
least ECU 5 bilon,  the aggregate  Commirzry  trver  of at least two of the firms is above  ECU 250 million
each, and at least two firms  have less than two-thirds  of their tumover  in the same  EU member  state.
9upon Articles 65-66 of the Treaty of Paris (European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC), and make
allowance for state aids permiitted  under ECSC auspices.
IV.  Competition Laws and Institutions in the CEE countries
Five of the six CEE countries currently have competition legislation in force: Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic.'  To a greater or lesser extent CEE laws
are modeled on the EU's approach to competition policy, distinguishing  between collusive arrangements
(Anticle  85), abuse of dominant positions (Article 86), and rules for mergers. All the Laws  apply to goods
and service markets (although some services are excluded in some jurisdictions), all appear to follow an
'effects doctrine' approach, and all are based on the conditional prohibition model.  While many types
of collusive arrangements appear to be prohibited on a per se basis,  in most cases exemptions are
possible. Although superficially similar, there are substantial differences  between the various law!.  The
discussion that follows draws upon the more detailed overview in Appidix  2.2  After the breakup of
the Czech and Slovauk  Federal Republic, the 1991 Federal competition law continued to be enforced in
both countries. The Czech Republic adopted an amendment to the 1991 Federal law in November 1993,
and a revised law is expected to be submitted to the Slovak Parliament in mid-1994.  Until the Slovak
Parliament adopts the draft legislation  the Slovak Antimoopoly  Office will apply the 1991 Czech and
Slovak Federal law.
Substive  discplines
All the CEE laws prohibit cetain  types of anti-conpetitive practices on a conditional basis.
The Czech and Slovak law is the only one to contain an unconditional  per se prohibition on arrangements
that violate legal norms of ethical behavior and on contracts that obstruct 'in  a substantial way economic
competition in a market."  It provides an illustrative list of agreements  that are prohibited (void) unless
an exemption is granted by the competition authorities.  Exemptions are automatic for an exhaustive list
of tys  of prohibited agreements if the authority makes no objection within two monhs  of the receipt
DIn  Romamia  work  is ongoing  on the drafting  of an anttrust law. At the ime of writing  the only laws to
address  some competition-related.  issues  are the 1991  Law on Unfair Compettion  and the 1990 Law No. 15
conceming  rescauring  of state  economic  units.  The former  incuds  some prnrciples  of free competition;  the
latter  prohibits  (on  a per se basis)  certain  practices,  including  price fixing  (Chapter  V, Association  and Free
Competition).
21Gray  (1993)  and Mastalir  (1993)  provide  comp  summaes of the anttrust legislation  in the CEECs.
10of the request  for an exemption.? For other  types  of agreements  explicit  exemptions  must be granted,
the criterion  being that this is in the public interest, in turn defined  as supporting  technological  or
economic  development.  The November  1993  Czech  amendment  to the Federal law  gives the Ministry
of Economic  Competition  the right  to grant  block  exemptions  along  EEC 85:3 lines. The Hungarian  law
contains a much shorter illustrative  list of prohibited  practices, relying instead on a general rule:
agreements  are not to result in a restriction  of rnonomic  competition.  Exemptions  can be granted  if an
agreement is aimed at stopping the "abuse  of economic  superiority," or is "of minor significance  (defined
as the firms  involved  having  less  than 10 percent  of the relevant  market),  or if the restriccdon  does not
exceed  what is required  to achieve  "economically  justifiable  comnon goals"  and the resulting  economic
benefits outweigh  the costs.  The Office of Economic  Competition  may present an appeal to the
Constitutional  Court  to express  criticism  of effective  laws and regulations. To date, this option  has not
been exercised  (OECD, 1993c).
The Polish law has an exhauive  rather than illustrative  list of prohibited  'monopolistic
practices'. Exemptions  may be grrited if the agreements  do not significantly  restrain  competition  and
are "necessary  to conduct  an economic  activity." The Bulgarian  law does not list specific  collusive
arrangements,  simply  contaning a sweeping  prohibition  on contracts  that restrict  the choice of a party
to the agreement  or consumers,  unless these are not injurious to consumers.  Exemptions  can be
All the laws follow  the EU approach  of prohibiting  the abuse  of dominant  positions. In
contrast to Article 86 EEC, the CEE countries  have specified  quantitative  criteria defining when a
position of daminance exists.  The Czech criterion is a market share of 30 percent or more; in Poland
it is 40 percent; in Hungary 30 percent (or 50 percent for the largest 3 firms); and in Bulgaria it is 35
percent.  Firms meeting the criterion are required to notify this to the antitrust authorities.  The Czech
and Slovak, Hungarian and Polish laws contain illustrative lists of abuses of dominant positions, while
the Bulgarian one has an exhaustive list.
Turning to merger disciplines, all the laws require firms to notify mergers that result in a
market share exceeding a target level.  These levels are those that comprise dominance, i.e., a market
share of at least 30, 40, 30, and 35 percent, respectively, for the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland,
Hungary and Bulgaria.  However, Hungary also requires all mergers where the joint turnover is at least
10 billion forint (some $100 million) to be notified, even if the market share threshold is not exceeded.
More generally, both the Czech and Slovak and Hungarian laws allow mergers that exceed the threshold
2 The agments  concemned  are uniform  application  of oconditons  of trade; rationalization  of economic  activity,
including  sealizaton  agreements;  nondiscriminatory  rebates; and ail instances  where  the market share of the
fims is below 30 prcent of the relevant  market.
11to be approved  if the resulting economic  benefits  offset the costs.  However, how these ten-as  are defined
remains unclear, and usually itrwill be up to the firm(s) involved to present a case.23 The Polish and
Bulgarian laws do not mention any criteria at all for approving mergers that exceed the market share
threshold.  In the Czech and Slovak case mergers are automatically approved if no objection is made
within three months of notification. In Poland and Hungary this period is two months, and in Bulgaria
only one month. Extensions of these time limits arc possible.
It is noteworthy  that the Czech and Slovak law gives the competition authorities  the right
to conmnent  on privatization  proposals. The law  requires the govermment  to analyze  the market conditions
that are likely to result from a privatization  proposal, and ensure that privatization will either result in
the abolition  of a monopoly  if one exists, or not result in a monopoly if one does not exist.  The Polish
law contins a similar provision that has been actively  applied. Over 1.900 'structural decisions' (relating
to  privatization and  transformation of  firms)  were  made  in  the  1990-92 period by  the  Polish
Antimonopoly  Office,  of which 89 percent were approved  (OECD, 1993a, p. 18). Hungary  and Bulgaria
do not give their competition offices similar (transitional)  powers.
Procedural  and institutional  provisions
In all cases a separate enforcement  agency  has been established. The powers of the agency
vary substantially  across CEE countries. The Bulgarian  Connmission  for Protection of Competition  is the
- weakest.  All its  members are appointed by  the National Assembly for a  5 year period and can
presumably be fired by the same.  It cannot impose fines in instances where it fids  the law to be
violated, having  to go through the civil courts to do so.  Its main remedy is the right to suggest to the
*Council  of Ministers that it impose  mandatory mmiimum  or maximum  prices for entities with a dominant
position.  The head of the Czech competition office is a member of the Goveriment (with the tide of
Minister of Economic  Competition).  The Czech antitrust office has the power to levy fines up to  10
percent of the firm's net turnover or equal to the profits garnered as a result of violating the law.  In
practice, however, some competition policy decisions are apparently taken in cabinet meetings-  In
Poland, two competition  bodies were created: an office in charge of investigations,  and a court in which
decisions may be appealed.  The head of the Polish Antimonopoly Office is appointed by the Prime
Minister.  Fines may be inqmosed  by the office up to  15 percent of after-tax earnings of the firms.
3 Arguments  hat  have  been  used in the Czech  context  by foreign firs  that  merged  with or acquired  Czech
enterprises  to demonstrate  that net benefits  were positive  to the economy  include:  (i) provision  of investment
necessary  for  reconstnuction/marmization  of plants;  (ii) enhancing  eors;  (iii)  improving  product  quaity and
competitivene; (iv) preserving  employment;  (v) introducing  moder management  techniques;  and (vi)
facilitating  transfers  of technology.
12Altematively, firms may be required to reduce prices and firms with a dominant position may be required
to divest parts of their operations.
The head of the Hungarian Office of Economic Competition is appointed by the President
for 6 years on the recommendation  of the Prime Minister, and can only be fired 'if  unfit for office on
a lasting basis."  The office is funded from  dLe  State budget, and is  answerable to  the Hungarian
Parliament.  It can impose fines ranging between 30 and 200 percent of the profits resulting from the
violation of the law.  The office has three parts: a Board of Experts responsible for investigations, a
Competition  Council which acts as an arbitration (administrative)  court, and a Department  of Competition
Policy that is responsible for research and policy advice to ParliamentL  The Council does not have
competence  to judge violations of 'unfair competition' (Chapter 1 of the Act), instead having to file suit
in civil court. The Slovak Antimonopoly  Office is a central government body.  Its Chairman is appointed
and recalled by the Govermnent.  Decisions of the Office can be appealed before the Supreme Court.
The antitrust agencies in the CEE countries are all required to publish decisions.  The
Czech, Hungarian and Bulgarian laws allow for hearings to be held, but do not require it. The Hungarian
enforcement agency is subject to the strictest time limits for investigations?25 Decisions by antitrust
offices can be appealed in all the jurisdictions.  In Poland appeals go to the special court created for this
purpose; in the other three countries appeals go through the civil courts.
The number of cases brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak
Republic have been quite significant.  In 1992, 255 cases were handled by the Hungarian Office of
Economic Competition; in the Czech Republic out of 1,200 complaints filed in  1992, the Czech Office
opened some 100 investigations. In Poland, 113 anti-monopoly investigations were launched in 1992,
the total for 1990-1992  being some 300 (OECD, 1994).  The Slovak Antimonopoly office investigated
158 and 164 cases in 1991 and 1992, respectively, and saw its case load rise to 274 cases in 1993.3
Ealuion
A commonality of the CEE laws is that imple  authorities are given a great deal of
discretion as far as interpretation of terms is concerned. Much will depend on the case law that emerges
from experience and the guidelines that are developed by the competiion offices.  Although the leeway
24 Pogacsas  and Stadler  (1993).
5 Cartel, merger and aU  other investigations  mnst  be concluded  within  45, 90 and 60 days, respectively.
Maximum  extensions  allowed  for each  category  are 45, 180,  and 60 days (Pogacsas  and Stadler. 1993).
Fmancial  Times  Businmess  Infornation, Busuiss Law Brief, DIALOG  database,  October  1992,  and private
corrspondence  with M. Banas.
13given  to administering  authorities  is substantial,  this also provides  an opportunity  to adopt  implementing
regulations  that increase  their ability to influence  trade/FDI  policy stances  (see below). As it stands,
however,  firms  operating  in the CEE countries  will face a substantial  amount  of uncertainty  regarding
the precise  nature  of the rules. Only  the Czech  and Hungarian  laws explicitly  make use of de minimis
provisions  (5 and 10  percent  share  of the relevant  market,  respectively).  Greater  use of the concepts  of
horizontal  and  vertical  restraints  would  help  increase  transparency  and certainty. Only  the Hungarian  law
makes a clear distincdon  along  these lines, only prohibiting  those vertical  restraints  that involve  firms
with a dominant  position.'  The reliance  on explicit  market share  thresholds  as the main criterion  for
dominance  distinguishes  the CEE laws from Article 86 EEC.  While apparendy a straightforward
indicator  that should  reduce  uncertainty  for firms, it may  be difficult  to monitor  for firms. Market  share
is also not a sufficient  indicator  of dominance.  Much will depend on the definition  of the relevant
antitrust  market  and  the extent  to which  entry  barriers  are found  to exist, issues  that is generally  left open
in the various  laws. Here the trade  policy stance  of each country  will be important.
The Hungarian  office  has the greatest  independence  from the political  system,  followed  by
the Polish and  Czech  offices. In general,  it appears  that greater  emphasis  could  be put upon procedurl
requirements  and transarency.  Hearings  are neither mandatory  nor necessarily  public. Decisions  and
argunents/reasoning/analysis  should  be subject  to a publication  requirement. There is a strong  political
economy  argument  to be made  for maximizing  transparency,  as this both increases  certainty/knowledge
of firms  regarding  what is allowed  and what is not, and reduces  the incentive  to engage  in rent-seeking.
V.  Competiton Rules and Trade Policy: Issues  and Options
In the context  of the EAs, four dist  time periods can be distinguished  for each  of the
CEE countries that are relevant in terms of the implementation of competition rules: (1) the period up
to the entry into force  of the competition  articles  of the Interim  Agreement;  (2) the period  until the entry
into force of the EA; (3) the phase  during which the EA applies;  and (4) the phase during which  the
country  has become  a member  of the EU.
The pre-Europe Agreement  phase
Each  CEE country  in principle  has only  three years  after the implementaion  of the Interim
Agrememe in which it is unconstrained  regarding its competition  policies.  Despite  EA obligations,
substatial discretion  remains  for national  authorities  regarding  the implemenion  and enforcement  of
D Poland  and the Slovak  Republic  have drafts of new legislation  that makes  this distincton, whilc  the November
1993  Czech  law does not.  However,  in applying  the law, the Czech  Ministy of Economic  Competiton  does
differentiate  between  vertical  and horizontal  agreements.
14its competition  policy.  In this section EA obligations  are assumed  away.  The question of EA
compatibility  is addressed  in the next  sub-section  (and  in Appendix  2). Taking  into account  die fact  that
the  majority  of the  CEE  countries  have  competition  laws  and  enforcement  bodies,  policy  issues  that  arise
include:  (1) whether  the competition  rules in force are adequate  or appropriate;  (2) at the level of
implementation,  what  should  be given  priority  by enforcement  authorities,  given  the substantial  amount
of discretion  implied  by the wording  of their respective  laws;  and (3) whether  the enforcement  agracies
have  sufficient  resources,  power,  and  political  independence  to do theirjob. In this  Section  the focus  will
be primarily  on the second  question. We only have limited  information  and knowledge  on the last
question. We simply  assume,  perhaps  heroically,  that there are no major  problems  in this connection.
[f there are, they should  be given  priority.2U  As to the first question,  many  of the CEECs are in the
process  of amending  their laws  (see Appendix  2), in part with a view to meeting  the EA obligations.
This is not the place  for a  ailed  discussion  of the specific  changes  to each  of the laws that might  be
considered  by the respective  governments.  Given  the wide scope  for discretion  that is inherent  in the
emforcement  of competition  law, decisions  that are inter-al to the implementing  bureaucracy  will to a
great  extent  determine  the effective  impact  of the laws. What is of key importance  then is to enhance
the transparency  of the process,  and minimize  to the greatest  extent  possible  any uncertainty  market
participants  might  have  regarding  the criteria  that  are employed  by the competition  authorities.
What  might  be done in addition  to what  is already  being  done  by competition  offices  with
a view  to reducing  the scope  for protection-seeking?  First, and  foremost,  it appears  useful  to clarify  the
potential  scope  of anttmst for local firms  by defining  terms  and criteria  used in investigations.  Given
the  great  latitude  that  enforcement  agencies  have  in the  CEE countries  as regards  interpretation  of the law
and  the application  of criteria,  very  much  can be done  in this.  manner  to reduce  uncertainty  and  focus  the
attenion  of the agency  in particular  directions.  Efforts  should  be made  to specify  clearly  what  practices
are  defacao  prohibited  on aperse basis, thereby  publicly  announcing  what  restraints  (and  those  economic
effects  or results)  that are considered  to be most pernicious. Drawing  upon the experience  of OECD
countries,  one procedure  could  be to distinguish  vertical  from horizontal  restraints,  and indicate  that
specific  horizontal  agreements  will  be viewed  very  critically  if requests  for exemptions  are  received,  while
vertical  restains  wilE  be regarded  as being much less likely to infrige upon competition  principles
(Willig, 1992). Those  jurisdictions  that do not have legislated  de minimis  criteria  should  adopt and
publish  relatively  high thresholds  in their implementing  procedures.  The EU approach  of defining  block
2 Howeer, the  Czech  compedtion  office  has been  held  to be undestaffed  by a Deputy  Minister  for
Competition.  BNA,  Amnmvst and Trade  Reguluion  Report, December  24, 1992,  no. 1596.  p. 787.
*  ~~~15exemptions can be  emulated. 3 This  again  does  not  necessarily  require  formal  legislation.  As
competition offices are  responsible for  granting exemptions, they  can determine the categories of
agreements that do not have to be notified.  Flassig (1993) has noted that during the transition, firms and
consumers that are negatively affected by restrictive business practices may be unwilling to bring cases
given their dependence on existing relationships.  It is therefore also important that the competition
authorities take a lead role, and exploit their mandate to self-initiate.'  Finally, transparency can be
further improved by publishing not only decisions but also the underlying analysis and reasoning.
Competition authorities can act as the 'conscience'  of the government, recognizing and
publicizing the costs to consumers of government policies and actions that restrict competition.  Trade
policy is one obvious area that should be given priority in this connection, the service sector another.
cbmpetition policy offices could consider actively applying antitrust law in the light of maintained trade
policies (e.g., accounting for the effect of protection on market structure, concentration, etc.).  Much can
be done in this connection  through appropriate wording of criteria and implementation guidelines within
the framework of currently existing legislation.  For example, trade policy considerations can be linked
to the definition of the relevant antrst  market. 3"  In principle, the more an industry is protected, the
narrower could be the definition of the relevant market, thereby reducing the expected profitability of
seeldng  protection, and thus the incentive to lobby for it.  In a similar vein, GATT ilIegal or 'grey-area'
measures such as voluntay  export restraint and import expansion agreements should be publicly stated
to be unenforceable, and subject to competition policy enforcement.32 De nmirumis  provisions can also
be .relatea to  the trade policy stance that affects an  industry.  The more  liberal are market access
conditions for foreign firms/products, the higher can be the threshold that is applied.
29As was  done by the Czech  Republic  in November  1993,  and is also envisaged  in the draft Slovak  law.
30  Polish  and Slovak  statistics  suggest  that complaints  account  for two-thirds  of total investigations  (OECID,
1994). Hln  Hungary,  the majority  of the pxocedures  in 1992  started  on the basis of applications  (236  cases), the
Office  of Economic  Competition  using its right to initiate  proceedings  er  offico in only 17  cases (OECD,
1993b). In part this may reflect  the wording  of the laws  and the tanstion  proces.  As noted  by Fomnalczyk
(1993),  the Polish  Anuimonopoly  office was obliged  to initiate  investigations  whenever  a complaint  was'
received,  and we  required  to review  applications  for all mergersfuasformationi. Resource  constraints  then
"crowded  out" a  ofici6 actions.
"  Aahorities have  substanti  latitude  in this connection,  as the relevant  market is not clearly  defined  in any of
the laws. ln most  jurisdictions  the concept  is defined  through  case law and administrative  practice.
'2  It can be noted  in passing  that GATT  obligations  and disciplines  have little impact  on the pursuit of domestic
competition  law, even  though in principle  the linkages  betwecn  GATT's  trade policy  disciplines  and domestic
competition  policies  are greatr than is commonly  thought. See Hockman  and Mavroidis  (1994).
16Active  scrutiny  of petitions  for contingent  protection  should  also  be pursued  by competition
authorities. Hungary  and Poland already have antidumping  legislation,  while the Czech and Slovak
Republics  intend to adopt the necessary  statutes.  Ample experience  in the EU and the U.S. has
demonstrated  that such  measures  may  be very costly to the economy. Antidumping  in particular  can be
used  as a tool to substantially  reduce  competition  and enforce  collusion. Ideally,  no contingent  protection
should  be granted by a governnent if this would  have a substantially  negative  impact  on competition
(e.g., strengthen  market power or dominance). The decision by the Polish government  to give the
Antimonopoly  Office the responsibility  of  implementing  antidumping  investigations  is particularly
noteworthy.  This is laudatory,  as it should  ensure  that competition  policy  criteria are applied  to the firms
(industry)  applying for protection.  Rather than being limited to an ex post  role, the competition
authorities  in Poland  have an ex ante responsibility. Of course, it is important  that competition  policy
criteria are indeed applied, and that ex post  monitoring  remain possible.  It is not necessary  that
competition  offices  be given  the task of applying  antidumping  actions;  what matters is that they are able
to vet such actions  before they are taken. Poland is unique  in this regard. However,  the draft Czech
amntidumping  statute also gives a  role to  the comnpetition  authorities.  While not given a formal
responsibility,  the draft  stute  proposes  that  the decision  to apply  an antidumping  action  be taken  by the
Govermnent,  and not by those administering  the statute.33  As the head of th.e  competition  office has
Ministerial  rank, this at least  allows competition  concerns  to be raised.
The political  situation  in the CEE countries  may  be somewhat  special  in this regard  as there
may be a perceived  conflict  between  vigorous  enforcement  of competition  law and the transition  to a
market economy.  For example, to attract inward FDI a govermment  may be willing to provide
'guaranteed'  markets to inward  investors, and do so in a way that conflicts  with competition  policy
principles. As noted  by Imrich  Flassig,
"Foreign  companies  participating  in mergers  often  demand  conditions  for the establishment
of joint ventures  that they would  never  dare to expect  in their home  countries. They took
for certain concessions  for the protection of their desired markets, such as customs
privileges. The foreign  partners in joint ventures  seem surprised by the reaction  of the
[Federal  Czechoslovak  Antitrust]  office  and  by the rights  that it has, although  in their  home
countries  they would  not behave in this way....  .A]s  a new insitution ... we find it quite
difficult  to devise  proper measures  for the necessary  ... strict adherence  to the law. But if
we demand  too  severe  terms, we may  discourage  many  foreign  investors;  that  would  restrict
the creation  of a competitive  environment,  affecng  particularly  the fuxre relaxation  of
13 East-west,  No. 558, October  28, 1993,  p. 3.
17protectionist measures in relation with the  EC (Flassig, 1993, pp.  73-74; see also
Fomnalczyk,  1993).?
Notwithstanding  active  participation  in the policy  formation  process,  CEE antitrust  offices  have  had only
limited  influence  in opposing  competition-reducing  policies,  be they  restructuring/privatization-related  or
trade-related. Thus, in the case of Poland, despite attempts  by the Antimonopoly  Office to prevent
excessive  concentration  in privatized  industries,  often  industrial  or social  policy  considerations  dominated
competition  concerns (OECD, 1994, p.  13).  Indeed, the Polish Antimonopoly  Office supported
substantial  reductions  in import  tariffs  for industries  that were highly concentrated  (monopolized).  The
resulting adjustment  pressures and deterioration  of the current account were such that tariffs were
subsequently  raised  in August 1991  (the average  tariff rising from 8 to 17  percent)  (Fornalczyk,  1993).
The Czech  government  guaranteed  Volkswagen  (which  acquired  a large  stake  in Skoda)  that import  tariffs
on cars would remain at 19 percent (15 percent for vehicles  of EU origin) for at least 4 years.35
However,  an active  stance  does have  some effect. For exnample,  the Czechoslovak  antitrust  office was
"absolutely  opposed"  to the imposition  of a high import  tariff on cars, and succeeded  in lowering  the
tariff that came  to be applied  (Flassig,  1993).
The main  point  to be emphasized  is that  competition  offices  have  two  ways  of 'internalizing'
trade policy.  The first is to oppose  trade policies  that excessively  harm competition  on the domestic
market;  the second  is to countervail  the anticompettive  effect  of trade policy  on an expost basis. The
fist,  'direct' approach  has been actively  pursued  by a number  of the CEE competition  offices. In this
they compare  very well to competition  offices  in OECD countries, who are much less visible.  By
commenting  on or opposing  suggested  or existig tade policies,  the competition  offices  ensure  that the
economy-wide implications of sectoral policiesllobbying are recognized  and discussed.  The main power
of competition offices is, however, of an expost  nature.  Active enforcement, with guidelines that clearly
specify  that trade policy  wili be an important  consideration  in the implementing  competition  laws, will
help  bolster  the effectiveness  of ea ate  opposition  to policy  proposals  that restrict  access to markets.
Another  possibility  that could be pursued is to use competition  law enforcement  as an
instument  to reduce the probability of facing contingent protection in export markets.  This is an issue
that applies during both the pre-EA and the EA phase, given the continued availability of antidumping
3 'The last smtement  is arguably  untrue, as what is being  cmeated  are rents.  Investors  may require some
inducements,  but guareed  markets  should  not be one of them.  Indeed,  a case cm be made that atacing
foregn direct investment  might  be given  priority over the braking up of monopolies,  but that an overriding
concern  should  be that the govenment dbes not maintain  barriers to entry-
35  East-we3r,c  No. 555, September  2, 1993,  p. 6.
18to EU import-competing  firms under the EAs.  The existence  of threats  of antidumping  and safeguard
actidns  on export markets increases  the incentive  to control state trading, subsidization,  and abuse of
dominant  positions. By enforcing  antitrust  law and allowing  entry, the feasibility  for import-competing
finns in export  markets  to argue  that unfair  trade is taking  place  is reduced. There are various avenues
that can be pursued here.  The first is simply  an informal 'lobbying' effort on the part of the CEE
government  involved,  under which  it is argued  that competition  law is being  actively  enforced,  that trade
barriers are low and that there is therefore no justification for aaddumping. This may have some
beneficial  impact,  depending  on the importance  of the EU industry  concemed. A  second,  complimentary,
approach  could be to exploit the 'positive comity' principle (see above).  The Connission could be
formally  requested  to examine  each  antidumping  petition  brought  by an EU firm/industry  in light  of the
active enforcement  of EU-based  competition  laws in the CEE home  market of the exporter.'  A third
is to ensure that the country is trea  as a market economy by importing nations implementing
antidumping  actions. Active  competition  law  enforcement  will help bolster  the case for this.'
The service sector may be of particular relevance in this connection, as perceived restrictions
on access  to distribution  channels  and related  services  is sometimes  held to be one  justification  for the
imposition  of antidunping measures. More generally,  whatever  the impact  on contingent  protection
actions in export markets,  it is very important  that antitrust authorities  actively  pursue a strategy of
fostering the contestability  of service markets.  Services are especially  important  in the process of
economic  development  in their role of inputs  into  the  production  process  generally.  Services  increasingly
comprise the largest share of value added to a manufactured  good.  Design, the organization  of
production,  inventory  and production  management,  packaging,  distibution, marketing  and after sales
interaction  with clients  (guarantees,  maintenance)  are all service  activities.
The nature of  services are  such that markets are  often characterized  by proximity
requirements  (prohibiting  trade and implying  that competition  is local), asymmetric  information  and
imperfect  competition38  Reputation  is often  crucial  in signalling  quality  to consumers,  and  as reputation
is difficult  to establish  (being  a sunk  cost),  service  markets  may  be difficult  to contest. Pervasive  product
3"  A statement  by Sir Leon  Brittan  on February  5, 1994  during an iaformal  meeting  of EU Trade Ministers  and
the EC Commission  bolsters  the importace of establishing  that CEE markets  are open and that compettion
laws are enforced: 'if the countries  of Central  and Eastern  Europe  want EU industry  to be satisfied  to the point
that EU markets  are further  opened,  the best assurance  they could have is that the same  competition  laws exist
in Central and Eastem Europe' (Europe  fnformation  Service,  European  Report, No. 1924,  February  9, 1994).
'  This is no longer  an issue  in the EU context. As of the entry into force  of the Interim Agreements,  the
CEECs are regarded  as market  economies  by the European  Commission.
t -See  Sapir, Buiges  and Jaquemin  (1993)  for a discussion.
19differentiation  may further  enhance  the market  power  of incurnbent  firms. While  it may  be the case  that
for certain  regulated  services  it is necessary  to ensure  that  quality  standards  are satisfied,  the competition
authorities  should  attempt  to ensure  that 'consumer  safety  justifications'  do not act to bolster  the market
power  of incumbent  firms by having  a protectionist  effect.
One lesson  that  can  be drawn  from  the past decade's  experience  with  privatization  of service
industries  in both developed  and developing  countries  is that many  services  that were (are)  provided  by
the public  sector can also be provided  by the private  sector, often at much lower  cost.  Of course, this
does  not necessarily  imply  transfer  of ownership  of assets,  or the absence  of regulatory  oversight. What
it does imply  is the adoption  of institutional  forms making  such markets  contestable. Foreign  investors
can make a significant  contribution  to the improvement  of the efficiency  of 'public' infrastructure
services. Development  of an efficient  economy  requires  that domestic  residents-both  final consumers
and businesses-have  access  to high quality services  for the lowest  possible  price.  Foreign  firms will
often offer services that are not provided by domestic incumbents,  but for which demand exists.
Moreover,  because  many  tnsnational  service  fims have  an international  reputation  which  they  need  to
maintain,  the average  quality  of the services  provided  is likely  to be both higher and more  constant  than
what is available  from domestic  firms. Many of the service  products  that  will be offered  in host  country
markets  are likely to have been developed  and tested elsewhere,  further reducing  quality  uncertainty.
However, prices charged will be competitive  only as  long as care is taken that foreign service
corporations  do not establish  a dominant position and exploit their market power.  It  is therefore
important  that efforts  are made to ensure dtat markets  remain  contestable. In practice  this implies  that
no restrctions  should  be placed  on the number  of foreign  firms  that  are alowed to offer specific  services.
Entry  should  be free, subject  to prudential  supervision  as deemed  necessary,  as the most effective  source
of competition  for many foreign  service  affiliates  is likely  to be (the threat  of entry by) other foreign  or
local service  corporations.
As many  service  firms  possess  certain  intangible  assets that  cannot  be patented  or similarly
protected,  care must be taken at  arrangements  that involve  the transfer of such assets and that may
appear  restrictive  at first sight are not automatically  deemed  to violate  the competition  rles.  Great  care
must be taken in determining  whether  such practices  are anti-competitive,  and if so, are detrimental  to
efficiency. In many cases  they may simply reflect the need of a fizm  to safeguard  its reputation  for
quality. What matters is the impact  on the contestability  of the markets  concerned. Free entry can be
expected to ensure that markets remain competitive-so that the variety and quality of services is
maximized  and  prices  are minimized.  -Even  service  industries  that have  natural  monopoly  characteristics,
so that only one or two firms are able to exist, can be made contestable  via the periodic  auctioning  of
20operating  licenses  by the govermnent.  The main  focus  of the  competition  authorities  in this regard  should
be on the regulatory  regime  that  affects  services  industries. 39
The Europe Agreement  phase
This phase  has two  parts: one transitional,  the other  the period  during  which  the EA is fully
implemented  and EU memnbership  is not yet achieved. The transitional  period is especially  important
because  competition  authorities  will have  to help ensure  that EA-envisaged  market access  liberalization
is realized, and is  not offset by  private/public  actions.  Once the EAs are  in  force, national
implementation  and enforcement  of competition  rules must  be consistent  with the relevant  EU principles
and the implementation  rules agreed  to by the Association  Councils  or Joint Committees.
There  are two  dimensions  to EA competition  policy  disciplines,  one  pertaining  to firms,  the
other  to governments.  As far as the latter  is concerned,  although  far-reaching,  EA obligations  will only
bite gradually. The complete  territory  of the CEE countries  will be regarded  as a disadvantaged  EU
'region' for five years  after the entry  into force  of the EAs. The  primary  substantive  requirement  in this
period is transparency  related:  each  CEE government  must establish  an agency  or body responsible  for
the collection  of data on state aids and subsidies  more generally. Governments  niight consider  going
beyond  this EA obligation  by establishing  (or supporting  the creation of) an institution  that not only
collects  data on subsidies/state  aids, but analyzes  such data and combines  them into industry-specific
measures  of effective  support. The Industries  Assistance  Comniission  in Australia  is an often  mentioned
example  that could  be emulated  (Spriggs,  1991).
Tuning to the classic  domain  of competition  policy, two  issues  arise: (1) the compatibility
of existing  laws  and  procedures  with  the EAs; and (2) the policy  options  facing  CEE authorities  once  the
EAs apply. The first question  is addressed  in Appendix  2.  In principle  the CEE competition  laws  are
modelled  on Art.85-86  EEC. However,  there  are inconsistencies  with EU language  and implementation
criteria/guidelines,  some  of them substantial. An example  is the scope for ptesenting  an 'efficiency
defense'  in merger  cases  in the Czech  and Hungarian  laws. This is not possible  under the EU Merger
39  Many  of the  CEE  competition  offices  are  sensitive  to these  issues. For  example,  the  draft  Slovak  oompetition
law  requires  the  penodic  auctionng  of operating  licenses.  The  Czech  Ministry  of Economic  Competition  has
been  particularly  active  in its atempts  to erhance  competition  in the  service  sector. The Minister  opposed  a
decision  by an inter-ministerial  commission  in the context  of the  privatization  of SPT  Telecom  to protect  it from
competition  for four  years,  and supported  the idea  that  foreign  entities  be able  to have  100  percent  control  of
local telecommunications  networks. The Ministry  has also challenged  the 20-year  monopoly  that was granted  to
Eurotel, the provider  of cellular  phones,  and supports  imports  of electricity  (Financial  Times  Business
Information,  Finance  East Europe,  March 4, 1994).
21Regulation.'  Another example is the provision in the Hungarian law permitting anticompettive
agreements  that are aimed at offsetting  'economic superiority', something  that clearly is not possible
under the EU rules.  In general, there is greater leeway  in the CEE laws for 'public interest' defenses.
Another example  is the possible exemption  of cartel agreement on this basis in the Czech and Slovak
law. Space  constraints  prevent  a detailed  analysis  of the various 'incompatibilities'  of CEE laws and EU
rules and practice (see e.g., de la Lauencie, 1993). Many of the differences  will have  to be addressed
in the coming  years.
Tuuming  to policy, an important  question  is whether  the entry into force of the EAs should
lead to a change in the relative weight/attention  that is granted to different types of competition  iaw
violations. For one, free trade/free establishment  for EU firms should  be enough to ensure that many
markes become  contestable. Moreover, once an EA is in force, CEE countries  may be able to rely in
part on enforcement  by the EC Commission. This will depend  to what  extent an anticomnpetitive  practice
in a CEE country  may have (potential)  effects on trade between  that country  and the EU and therefore
be subject to EU enforcement. An implication  is that less attention may be necessary  with respect to
potential abuse of domnant  positions, as the contestability  of  markets will presumably increase
substantially. Greater  priority might consequently  be given to nontradable  industries  in general, and to
those tradeable sectors where liberalization  occurs most gradually, or not at all.  Taken into account
Commission  resource  constan  and the limited significance  of CEE markets in most products, CEE
govemments cannot realistically rely on the Commission  for :he enforcement  of  EA competition
disciplines. Vigorous  national  enforcement  will remain crucial  in the EA phase. 4'
EA obligations  in the area  of trade liberalization  are much more  far-reaching  than-those  of
the GATr, but are of course preftential in nature. Thus, there is sdll a need  for concern  about the  trade
policy stn  vis-a-vis the rest of the world.  Although freedom of trade and establishment  is to be
achieved  within  ten years of the entry into force of the EAs, tariff elimination  is gradual, and QRs have
been maintained  for certain activities during the transition5  The binding nature of the EAs should
- See  Jaquemin (1990)  ad  Neven  et al. (199).
41  For exmple, it is unikely  thmany  megers involving  EU  and CEE  firns will  satisfy  the EU's  criteria  for
turnover  and maket sbare. In practice,  EU  anforcem  can  be expected  to aply largely  in inces  where
the merger  involves  a dtird-coumtry  firm.
42 Quotas  were  to be abolished  by the CEECs  upon  entry  into  force  of the agreements,  with  a few exceptions
for 'sensitive'  industries  such  as automobiles.  Poland  committed  itself  to eliminate  tariffs  on about  30%  of its
imports  from  the EU  in 1992,  and to abolish  the remainder  over a seven  year  tramsition  period,  with duty
reductions  taing place  during  the  last four  years. Hungary  will  liberalize  12-13%  of its imports  over a dtrce
year  period  in anmual  steps  of one-third,  another  20%  between  1995  and 1997,  agaim  in steps  of one-third  and
the rest  (twotirds) between  1995  and 2001,  in steps  of one-sixth  per year. The  Czech and Slovak  Republics
22ensure  that protection  is indeed  transitional,  and  domestic  protected  industries  will  presumably  realize that
they have only a limited period of timne  to prepare for competition  from EU firms.  A potential problem
that arises is that protection creates vested interests, and these can be expected  to lobby the govemment
for continued  assistance. One way this might be done within the confines of the EAs is to argue for
'safeguard' actions  once liberalization  starts to bite. The primary safeguard  mechanism  embodied  in the
EAs allows actions to be taken if imports from the trading partner "cause  or threaten serious injury to
producers  of like products or serious disturbance  in any sector of the economy  or difficulties  which could
bring about serious  deterioration  in the economic  situation of a region' (Article 30 of the Hungarian  EA).
This is very broad language. The concepts (criteria)  are also not defined, nor is reference  made to the
GAfT or other treaties for guidance. There are no explicit sunset provisions or time limits.4
Competition  offices  should  take into account  the antitrust implications  of safeguard  actions,
and actively  enforce  the law in instances  where safeguard  actions  result in violations. Similar issues may
arise as far as establishment-  is concerned. The  CEE countries  will grant free entry and national  treatment
to EU firms, subject  to negotiated  phase-in periods for certain sectors or activities. The modalities  and
content of these exceptions  again differ across CEE countries."  There is also a need to consider other
will  dismantle  over  a sevna  year  period. A preferential  tariff quota  was  established  by Poland  for motor  vehicle
imports  from  EC producers  (25,000  units, to increase  by 5% a year, and to be abolished  within  10  years),  and a
list of 144  items  remain  subject  to import  licensing  in Hungauy.  This includes  passeng cars (subject  w a
preferential  quota  of 50,000  uiits, to increase  by 7% per year),  aircraft,  telecommunications  equipment,
chemicals,  pharma  s,  plastics,  wood  and  leather  products,  and footwear.  Between  Janay  1, 1995  and
end-1997,  Hungary  is to eliminate  quantitative  restricdons  on EC exports  of these  goods  up to an amount  of 40
peren  of such  imports. All QRs  are to be eliminated  by end-2000,  and are to be increased  by 10  percent  per
year during  the transition  period.
43Te  foregoing  refers  to the EAs  geneal safeguard  clauses:  e.g., Articles  29 and 30 of the Hungarian  EA.
The  EAs  also contain  a safeguard  clause  allowing  temporay entry  restrictions  andlor  trade  barriers  to be
introduced  by CEECs  during  the first stage  of the tramsition  period  to support  industri and comercial sectors
undergoing  restrucuing pmgrams,  of an 'infant  industry'  natue, or facing  elimination  or a drastic  reduction  in
total market  share. Tariffs,  if used, are  not to exceed  25%, EU producers  are to be given  a ma  of
preference,  quotas  if used  are not to exceed  15%  of the total indusial imports  from the EU, and actions  may
only be taken  within  three  years of liealization of market  access  and are not to last  moe tha  five  yeaus.
Two  A  Es  are rxepnive.  Poland  granted  immediate  freedom  of establishent ad  nationa treatment  for
construction  and most mm  g  acvities, with the exception  of mining,  praceing  of precious  stones  and
metas, explosives,  ammunition  and weaponry,  phamacuticals, alcohol,  high voltage  power  lnee and pipelie
transportation.  AR  but the last two  acivities are to be liberalized  by the end of the first stage  of the  transition
period  (5 years),  at which  time most  service  sects  will also be libralized (financial,  legal  and real state
services  excepted).  By the end of the transitional  period  (ten  years) acquisition  of state  owned  assets  under
privadzation;  owneship,  use, sale and rent  of real property;  real estate  agency  services;  legal  services;  high
voltage  power  lines;  and  pipeline  transportation  will  be libealized. Th  Czechoslovak  agreement  liberadiz  all
sectors  immediately  except  for defence  industry,  steel,  miwnng,  acquisition  of sat-owned assets  under
privatizadon,  ownship, use, sale and ren of real property,  and real estate  service  activities,  and the financial
23options through  which firms may seek to continue to benefit from govenunent support. As noted earlier,
Poland has given EU car producers preferential access to its market, by imposing a tariff quota on
imports,  and defining  criteria for the allocation  of this quota that strongly favor European  firns that have
invested  in Poland (Messerlin, 1994). Tarffs  on cars are currently high, standing at some 35 percent.
The provisions of a recent joint venture agreement  between FSO, the Polish state-owned  car company,
and General  Motors illustrates  the pressures  that may arise to maintain  such the benefits of arrangements.
The Polish government provided assurances in the contract establishing the joint venture that it "will
compensate  GM for losses resulting from future changes in tariff and tax conditions.""  That is, GM
will  apparently  be able to demand  compensation  from the govermment  to offset the reduction in the tariff
from 40 percent to zero that is required under the EA over a ten year period.  The signal to potential
competitors  is clear: the costs of contesting  the Polish market will be higher. Careful scrutiny  should be
given  to such arrangements  so as to ensure that no abuse of a dominant  position results, and that markets
remain contestable.
An implication  of the foregoing  is that competition  offices  need to continue  to keep a wary
eye on trade policy.  The entry into force of the EA should imply that somewhat  less emphasis can be
given to the behavior of firms with a dominant position  that produce tradables, and that greater priority
be given to nontradables (services)  and industries where the transition to free trade and/or freedom of
establishment  is long or delayed.  As already noted, access to many service markets will only be
liberalized gradually,  on  a  national treatment basis,  with  establishment being necessary.  The
contestaoility  of these  markets will largely be determined  by the  attitude taken by the antitrust authorities.
The EAs do not require liberalization  of cross-border trade in services, this presumably  being kept off
the agenda to prohibit regulatory competition. As a result, it remains important that the competition
authorities  continue to closely monitor the contestability  of service markets.
A special complication  arises from the continued existence of antidumping  and safeguard
threats under the EAs.  This may be an inducement  for CEE firms to collude, if not explicitly then
tacitly, with each other and with EU competitors. Continued  threats of contigent protection  on the part
of the EU implies that CEE firms will face different standards than their EU competitors. EU firms will
be permitted to engage in price discriminaton or sell below cost on the EU market, whereas CEE firms
will be constrained  in pursuing such a strategy by the existence  of EU antiduiping procedures. On EU
service  industry. These  activities  ae to be liberalized  by the end of the ten year  tansition period. Both
countries  pemanenty exclude  ownership  of natural  resources  and agricultual land/forests.
u -GM  and Polish  cmaker  reach  assembly  deal,' Funacial  flirt,  November  14 1993,  p. 5.  It was  GM
Europe  doat  originally  asked the Polish  govemment  to introduce  this  high tariff rate, apparenty making  this a
precndition  for its joint ventme  with  FSO  (Messerlin,  1994,  p. 9).
24markets,  price  discrimination  by CEE finns in the sense  of selling  products  at prices below  those charged
at home  may lead to antidumping  petitions  if this injures  EU firms.  Such dumping  is unlikely  to be the
result of concerted  practices  or abuse of dominant  positions, as these will be difficult  to attain by CE2
finns.  Nor  can it be argued  that  CEE firms are unfairly  benefitting  from a protected  home  market. Once
the EAs are implemented,  all tariffs, QRs, and restrictions  on FDI will have been abolished.
As antidumping  remains a threat under the EAs, the focus should arguably still be on
reducing  the likelihood  of contingent  protection  being  invoked  by the EU. Strict  enforcement  of antitrust
may help convince the EC Commission  and Member States to be hesitant to pursue complaints  of
dumping. Advocates  of antiddnping policies often  argue it is a justifiable  attempt by importing  country
govermments  to offset the market access restrictions  existing in an exporting firm's home country that
underlie  the ability  of such firms to dump.  Such restrictions  may consist of import barriers preventing
arbitrage,  but may  also reflect  the non-existence  or non-enforcement  of competition  law by the exporting
country.'  Antidumping  is then defended  as an inferior instrument  to offset such 'government-made'
competitive  differences,  the optimal  solution  being  held to be elimination  of the differences.
The experience  that has been obtained  with attempts  to abolish antidumping  in the context
of regional integration  agreements  suggests that there are at least three necessary  conditions for the
abolition  of contingent  protection: (1) free  trade and freedom  of investment;  (2) disciplines  on the ability
of.governments to assist firms and industries located on their territory; and (3) the existence  and
enforcement  of competition  (antitrust)  legislation  (Hoelknan  and Mavroidis, 1994). All three elements
can be regardedcas  forming an implicit market access  'guarantee', the objective  being to safeguard  the
conditions  of competition  on regional  markets, As far as the CEE countries  are concerned  it seems  that,
although these conditions  will to a very great extent be satisfied, the EU felt the need to take out
insurance. Clearlj, the first best strategy for CEE countries  is to seek the elimination  of antidumping
once  the EAs have-been  fllMy  implemented. This is an issue that could  be taken up by the Association
Councils.
A second  best, possibly  transitional,  strategy could  consist of attempts  to secure  agreement
that antidumping  becomes  the mechanism  of last resort.  One pcssibility in this connection  is to seek
agreement  that.allegations  of dumping  are  first investigated  by the EU's competition  authorities  (DG-IV).
The  objective  of this investigation  would  be to determine  whether  the exporting  fhm or industry  engages
in anti-competitive  practices  or benefits  from  government-created  or supported  entry  barriers that violate
Thuis,  the U.S. hai claimed  tha lax  Japanese  antitrust  enforcement  permits  Japanese  firms  to collude,  raise
prices,  and  use parnof  the  resulting  rens to cross-subsidize  (dump)  products  sold  on foreign  markets. See
Gartn (l94)  for a detailed  defense  of antidumping  that emphasizes  entry  burse  in the exporter's  home
market.
25the EAs. If anti-competitive  behavior  is found  to exist, 'standard' remedies  would  be applied  (i.e., cease
and desist orders, fines, etc.). Initiation  of an antidumping  investigation  should  only be possible if the
investigation  by the conmetition  authorities  has revealed  the existence  of barriers to entry in the CEE
market that do not violate  the EA.
Third-best,  in the absence  of a formal agreement  on the matter, is to continue  to vocally
oppose antidumping, especially once the EAs are fuilly implemented.  Given that EU-consistent
competition  rules will  have  been  implemented,  a CEE goverunent has strong  arguments  on which  to base
opposition  to EU antidumping  actions. Continued  action against  state aids will also help to reduce  the
scope for contingent  protection. The fact that the Commission  has somewhat  greater discretion on
antidumping  than  do administering  authorities  in certain  other  jurisdictions  further  increases  the incentives
for the CEE countries  to 'make a case.'
Whatever  tums out to be feasible  with regard  to antidunping, it should  be remembered  that
safeguard  actions remain  a possibility. The elimination  of this option should  also be on the agenda, a
necessary  condidon  again being  that the EAs have been fully implemented,  and the resulting  adjustment
has occurred. The main issue in the short run is to reduce as much as possible the scope for EU firms
to argue that CEEC firms are trading 'unfairly'.  Undercutting  the basis for the rhetoric of allegations
of unfair trade is important,  as protection  is then much  more easily recognized  for what it is.
The Third Phase: Membership of the European Union
It is unclear how long it will take each CEE country to achieve  membership  of the EU.
What matters from the aitrust  perspective  is not when  accession  will occur, but what changes  will be
reqied  in competion  policy enforcement.  The specifics of the competition legislation and the
procedures  and criteria that are applied are largely unconstained by EA membership. However, the
scope of membership  is much more fkr-reaching  than the EAs. The EAs are ambiguous  regarding  the
exent to which access  to service  markets  will be liberalized. Disciplines  in areas such as the regulation
of utilities, and telecoms  will expand. As a result the reach of EU competition  disciplines  is liely  to
exand.  National  regulations  that may  restrict entry  into certain  industries  and that would  not be covered
by the EAs may become  impossible  to maintain  once a member.  Another change is that the  reat of
contigent protection  disappears. Intra EU-CEE  antidumping,  CVD and safeguard  actions  will become
impossible,  if not immediately  then after a transition  period as was the case under the Treaty of Rome
(Art. 91 EEC). Consequently  there will be less pressure  on national  competition  authorities  to monitor
the effects  of threals  of contingent  protection. More importantly,  the government  essentially  loses  control
of its trade policy, this being an EU competence. External  tariffs will therefore have  to be adjusted  to
the EU's common  tariff.  The EU (Commission)  will also become much more of a factor in enforcing
26.Articles  90 and 92. In short, life becomes  much  simpler from the perspective  of the antitrust authorities.
Their main task will be to prevent the exploitation  of power on local markets.
VL Concluding Remarks
The comparative  analysis of the competition  laws of the CEE countries illustrates  that the
majority of  them have moved towards an,  in principle, satisfactory legal framework to  promote
competition  in a relatively short period of time.  Although initially under the influence  of both the US
and the EU competition  laws, the CEE countries have chosen by and large to adopt legislation  that is
similar to that of the EU.  At this stage the successful  protection of competition  in the CEE countries
depends  almost entirely on national  policies, of which enforcement  of competition  laws is one important
element.  But even under the EAs, national enforcement will remain important, both because of the
relative insignificance  of national CEE-markets,  but also because of resource limitations  on the part of
the Commission.
In a number  of areas  the CEE competition  laws and enforcement  agencies  compare  very well
with those of OECD countries.  The 'trade policy awareness' of the authorities is quite high, indeed,
much higher than appears to be the case in many OECD comparators. In part this reflects  the political
importance  or weight  that is granted to the competition  authorities  in many of the CEE countries (e.g.,
the Czech decision  to give the head of the competition  office Ministerial  rank) and their willmgness  to
attack  trade policy decisions  that substantiaUy  reduce competitive  forces on domestic markets. Although
the emphasis  that is placed on competition  policy in the CEECs is in part a reflection of the need to
establish a market economy, OECD goverments  could enhance competition on their markets by
emulating  some aspects  of CEE.  competiton law enforcement. Examples  are the mandate to scrutinize
and comment  on the competition  implications  of government  policies generally, and giving the head of
the compeion  office the opportnity  to participate in cabinet meetings.
A mnmber  of actions  have been identified  through which competition  law enforcement  might
be strengthened  and be made even more sensitive  to trade policy. The legislative  possibility  for antitrust
agencies  in the CEE countries  to act ea offico does not appear  to have been fully exploited,  although  this
may largely be the result of the process of the transition towards private ownership and a market
economy.  The development  of detailed guidelines would help both reduce uncetinty  regarding the
priorities given  by the competition  authorities  to types of compedtion-reducing  practices, and clari  what
practices wil  not be pursued.  One common denominator  in the legislation of all CEE countries is the
wide discretion that the agencies entrusted with the enforcement  of competition  laws enjoy.  This can
27have a negative  side, in the sense that a number of desirable  per se prohibitions  simply do not exist.  An
offsetting, positive counterpart is  that  if  discretion  is exercised in  a  pro-competition way,  the
'jurisprudence" created  in  this  field  could further promote the  goals of  the  competition laws.
Incorporation  of the trade policy stance  pertaining  to an industry should explicitly be taken into account
when  defining the relevant market in the enforcement  of antitrust.  Guidelines  to this effect should also
be published.  Whenever market shares are defined as a threshold (i.e in the definition of dominant
positions)  they should be linked to market contestability  considerations-i.e., explicit public recognition
that what matters is market power.  It would prove very useful for the evolution of the competition
philosophy  in the CEE countries, and at the same  time enhance  transparency, if competent  agencies  were
to publish the reasoning  underlying  their decisions.
One avenue that could be further explored during the transition phase (i.e.,  until full
implementation  of th-e  EAs) is the exploitation  of the principle  of "positive  comity".  This could  provide
a link  between  antidumping  and antitrust in instances  where CEE countries are facing antidumping  threats
or actions  on the part of the EU.  That is, the EC Commission  could  be asked to apply  competition  policy
cnteria in antidumping  investigations  against products originating  in CEE countries, ensuring that there
is a threat to competition, not just a threat to an EU competitor.  This could be sought on an informal
basis during the transitional period.  If it proves to be impossible to obtain agreement to phase out
antidumping  once the EAs are fillly implemented,  a second-best  policy could be to formalize the link
between competition  law enforcement  and antidumping  investigations. More generally, since the CEE
countries  have adopted legislation  comparable  to that of the EU in the competition  field, one can assume
that if  they enforce their competition laws vigorously, EU-onsistent  minim  standards will  be
respected.  This may effectively raise the threshold for  EU  import-ompeting  industries seekig
antidumping  relief.  Vigorous enforcement  of competition  disciplines in service industries, especially
distribution-related,  may further help reduce the potential for EU firns  to seek contingent  protection.
In any event, enhancing  the contestability  of service markets will be very important  in the development
of a competitive  environment. In general it would be desirable to create an independent  and objective
body that is given the mandate to evaluate government  policies from a competition  policy perspective.
In the absence of such an entity, competition  offices should devote resources to building a capacity and
reputation for  high-quality, objective analysis of the effects of government policies that affect the
contestability  of markets.
Until the EAs are fully implemented  it is important  to reduce as much as possible the risk
of being treated as an  "unfair trader."  Safeguard actions will always remain possible as long as
membership of the EU has not been attained.  But safeguard  protection is more difficult to seek and
obtain if the case for arguing that CEE firms are benefitting  from trade barriers, state aids, or various
28types  of government  maintained  entry  barriers  is weak. From  this  perspective  active  competition  law
enforcement  will  be of particular  importance  to the CEE  countries  in the immediate  future.
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31Appendix 1
Competition Disciplines  in the Europe Agreenents
Article 624
1.  The following  are incompatible  with the proper functioning  of the Agreement, in so far as
they may affect trade between the Cornmunity  and Hungary:
(i)  all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition;
(ii)  abuse by one or more undertakings  of a dominant position in the territories of the
Community  or of Hungary as a whole or in a substantial  part thereof;
(iii)  any public aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition  by favoring certain
undertakings  or the production of certain goods.
2.  Any practices  contrary to this Article shall be assessed  on the basis of criteria arising from
the application  of the rules of Articles 85, 86, and 92 of the Treaty establishing  the European  Economic
Community.
3.  The Association  Council  shall, within  three years of the entry into force  of the Agreement,
adopt by decision  the necessary  rules for the implementation  of paragraphs 1 and 2.
4.a  For the purposes  of applying  the provisions  of paragraph  1, point (iii), the Parties recognize
that during the first five years after the entry into force of the Agreement, any public aid granted by
Hungary  shall  be regarded as an area identical to those areas of the Community  descrbed in Article 92.3
(a), of the Treaty  establishing  the European  Economic  Community. The Association  Council  shall, taling
into account  the economic  situation  of Hungary,  decide whether  that period should  be extended  by further
periods of five years.
4.b  Each party shall ensure tansparency in the area of public aid, inter alia by reporting
annually  to the other party on the total amount and the distribution  of the aid given and by providing,
upon request, information  on aid schemes.  Upon request by one party, the other party shall provide
information  on particular individual  cases of public aid.
5.  With regard to products referred to in Chapters 11 and 111 of Title 111 [i.e. agriculture]
the provision of paragraph 1 (iii) does not apply.  Any practices contrary to paragraph 1 (i) should be
assessed  according  to the criteria established  by the Community  on the basis of Articles  42 and 43 of the
nIn  the Ineim Agreements  the relevant  Article  is identical  to that in the Europe  Agreemem,  except  that each
reference  to the Association  Council  is replaed with a refcrence  to the Joint  Committee  set up by the
Agreement  on Trade  and Commercial  and Economic  Cooperation.
32Treaty establishing  the European  Economic  Community  and in particular of those established  in Council
Regulation  26/1962.
*6.  if tlie Conmmunity  or Hungary considers that a particular practice is incompatible  with the
terms of the first paragraph  of this Article, and is not adequately  dealt with under the implementing  rules
referred to in Paragraph 3, or in the absence of such rules, and if such practice causes or threatens to
cause serious prejudice to the interest of the other Party or material injury to its domestic industry,
including its service  industry, it may take appropriate  measures  after consultation  within the Association
Council or after 30 working days following  referral for such consultation,
In'the case of practices  incompatible  with paragraph 1 (iii) of this Article, such appropriate
measures may, where the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade applies thereto, only be adopted in
conformity  with the procedures  and under the conditions  laid down by the General Agreement  on Tariffs
and Trade and any other relevant  instrument negotiated  under its auspices  which are applicable  between
the Parties.
7.  Notwithstanding  any provisions to the contrary adopted in conformity  with paragraph  3, the
parties shall exchange information  taking into account the limitations imposed by the requirements of
professional  and business secrecy.
8.  This Article shall not apply to the products covered  by the-Treaty  establishing  the European
Coal and Steel Treat  which are the subject of Protocol N 2.
Article 64
With regard to public undertakings,  and undertakings  to which cpecial  or exclusive rights
have been granted, the Joint Committee shall ensure that as from the third year following the date of
entry into force of the Agreement, the principles'of the Treaty-establishing  the European Economic
Community, notably  Article 90, and the principles  of the concluding document  of the April 1990  Bonn
meeting of the Conference  on Security and Cooperation in Europe, notable entrepreneurs' freedom of
decision, are upheld.
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An Overview  of Competition  Legislation  in Bulgpia, the Czech
Republic,  Hungary, Poland and the Slovak  Republic
BULGARIA
The "Law  on the Protection  of Competition' 4 (published  in State  Gazette  no. 39 of May
17, 1991, Correction  State Gazette  no. 79/1991) constitutes  the legal framework  protecting  free
competition  in Bulgaria. According  to Art. 1(1): "the  object  of this law is to guarantee  the coniditions
necessary  for free  enterprise  in manufacturing,  trade and  services,  for a free determining  of prices  and
for the protection  of consumers'  interests."
The Act differs not only linguistically  (the term 'monopoly  position' is used to cover
dominant  positions  as well  as  monopolies),  but  also  substantially  from  the  laws in force  in the  other  CEE
countries. The scope  of discretion  as well as the form of action  of the competent  authority  are much
more  restricted.  The  Bulgarian  Act  comprises  a set  of definitions  and strict  prohibitions  of behavior  that
is deemed  to be anticompetitive  and leaves  little room  for the competent  authority  to exempt  specific
arrangements.  The Act does  not make  it clear whether  the effects  doctrine  suffices  for the authority  to
assert jurisdiction.  Art.  1(2) implies this possibility, however, as it states "...  which could lead to
restrictions  on competition  in Bulgaria",  without  explicitly  stating the locus of the anticompetitive
behavior.
The Act distingutishes  between 'monopoly  positions' and 'other prohibited  practices',
'Monopoly  positions'  cover  not  only  monopolies,  but  also  dominant  positions  and  to some  extent  mergers.
'Other prohibited  practices'  deal mainly  with forms of collusion. According  to Art 3, a monopoly
position  exists  if a person  either  possesses  the exclusive  right  to engage  in a certain  kind  of economic
activity  by virtue  of law or has a market  share that  exceeds  35  % of the relevant  market. The threshold
set forth in the Act in this second  case certainly  does not qualify  as a monopoly. Indeed,  in some
jurisdictions  it does  not even  suffice  to qualify  as a dominant  position.
All authorities  are prohibited  from adopting  decisions  that might lead  to the creation  of
'monopoly  positions'. This  prohibition  is only  effective,  however,  to the extent  that  the aforementioned
decisions  "limit significantly  the freedom  of competition  or the free determining  of prices" (Art. 4).
Accordingly,  if mergers  lead  to 'monopoly  positions',  they  are prohibited  as well  (Art. 5).  However,
an exemption  nay be requested  from  the competent  authority.  If no opposition  is registered  within  thirty
days of notification,  authorization  .is considered  granted  (Art. 6.2).
The Act includes  a list of abuses  of 'monopoly  position'. This list includes  classical  cases
like  price-fixing,  restricting  output  or access  to markets,  tie-ins,  monopoly  pricing,  market  sharing,  and
ul Hereinafter  the  Act.
34'exclusive  distribution  agreements.  While  its wording  is wide,  the list seems  to be an ahaustive  one. 49
When  it comes  tO  the regulation  of forms  of collusion,  the Act contains  only one provision  that  is all
encompassing:  Art, 8(2)  stipulates  that: "contractual  terms  restricting  one  of the  parties  with  respect  to
the  choice  of the  market,  suppliers,  buyers,  sellers  or consumers,  except  when  the restriction  arises  from
the nature  of the contract  and is not injurious  to the consumers,  are prohibited." The possibility  to
request  an exemption,  outside  the grounds  enlisted  in Art. 8(2)  is open,  if such  a request  is deposited  to
the competent  authority.  (Art. 9).
Procedural  provions
The competent  authority  entrusted  with the responsibility  to ensure that the substantive
provisions  of the Act  will  be observed,  is the "Comnmission  for the Protection  of Competition".  Its tasks
are described  in the "Statute  on the organization  and activities  of the Commission  for the protection  of
competition"m  (published  in State Gazette no. 94 of November  15, 1991).  Art. 3 of the Statute
stipulates  that  the Commission  for the Protection  of Competition  has the following  basic functions:  (1)
prevcnting  restrictions  on competition  in Bulgaria;  (2) applying  the measures  provided  for in the laws
against  restrictions  of competition  and against  unfair competition;  and (3) ensuring  protection  against
abuse  of a monopoly  position  in the market,  as well as against  other activities  which  may lead  to a
restriction  on competition."
The Commission  consists  of a chairman,  two  vice-chairmen  and eight  members.  All are
appointed  by the National  Assembly  for a period  of five years."  The guarante  fbr transparency  are
expressed  through  the obligations  to publish  and  notify  all decisions  as well  as through  the possibility  to
have  hearings  of the interested  parties  before the Commission.  The Commission  can self-initiate  or
respond  to complaints  brought  by natural  or legal  persons.
ITe discretionary  power  of the  Commission  is, to some  extent,  curtailed  in comparison  with
those of the authorities  in the other CEE countries,  mainly  because  of the heavier reliance  of the
Bulgarian  Act on per se prohibitions.  However,  much  depends  on how  the Commission  makes  use of
its powers  when  dealing  with  these  issues,  as the wording  of the Act still  leaves  some  discretion  to the
Commission  in a number  of areas. What  the Commission  cannot  do is to impose  fies.  If it thinks  that
this should  be the appropriate  remedial  action,  the Commission  mst submit  a case  before  the  competent
Bulgarian  Court  of Law  (Art. 18.2  of the Act). The Conmmission  d as  possess  one  specific  remedy  that
the authorities  of other CEE  countries  do not. Art. 16 stipulates  that "whenever  an abuse  of monopoly
position  occurs  and  at the initiative  of the Commission  for the  Protection  of Competition,  the  Council  of
Ministers  or a body authorized  by it may  establish  maximum  and/or  mniimum  prices  which  shall  be
"9  For example, applying  an obviously  unequitable  approach  towards  different  clients  or unequitable  term . -
(Art. 7.1). Art. 7 does  not include  any word  to this respect  that would  make  the list indicative.
5 Hernfter  the Statute.
5 Art. 2.2 of the Act; half of the members  must be qualified  lawyers  with a least 10 years  professional
expene.
3 See Arts.  9ff of the Statte.
35obligatory for the person with a monopoly  position."  Although the ultimate decision does not lie within
its  competence,  it is the Conmmission  that sets the process in motion.
CZECH REPUBLIC
The "Competition  Protection Act" of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (No. 63/1991
Coll. of law) entered into force in March 1991. It was amended by the Czech Republic in November
1993  (No. 286/1993 Coll. of law). The amendment  of the Act implies rather limited  changes to the 1991
Federal law.  More substantial changes  in order to make the legislation  fully compatible with EU law are
expected to be made by 1996.
The 1991 Act is a comprehensive  piece of legislation that resemnbles,  to a large extent, the
antitrust rules of the EU.  The basic objective  of the Act is "to protect economic  competition and create
conditions for its further development, and to prevent the creation and maintenance  of monopolistic  or
dominant position of legal and physical persons in their business activities, if it precludes or restricts
economic  competition"  (Art. 1). The Act distinguishes  between  forms of collusion (with  special treatment
of mergers)  and dominant  positions. It provides for the establishment  of the office of the Czech Republic
of Economic Competition, which is entrusted with the responsibility of eliminating anti-competitive
measures.  Anti-competitive  practices in both goods and services markets are covered (Art.3).  The
November 1993  amendment  extends  the reach of the law to associations of business, including chambers
of commerce.
The Act provides a list of perse prohibited  practices, that are deemed to be anti-competitive.
These practices, listed in Art 3(2), to a large extent reoroduce the forms of collusion described in Art.
85 EEC, and include price-fixing, market segmentation,  barriers to entry, and limitation  of production.
The list in Art 3(2) is illustrative, not exhaustive. 53 Art.  3(1) stipulates that:  Agreements and other
forms of mutual understanding achieved  by entrepreneurs which result or, because of their nauire, may
result by influencing  conditions of production or turnover in the goods and services market ...  in the
elimination  or restriction of economic  competition, are described as cartel contracts ... which.  are ilicit
and void if this Act does not state otherwise  or if the body for economic competition ... has not granted
an exception." This wording is wider than the corresponding  wording in Art. 85(1) EEC.
In the November 1993 amendment  the Ministry for Economic  Competition  was granted the
right to provide  block exemptions along the lines of Art. 85(3) EEC.  Moreover, reference is no longer
made to cartel agreements, but to "agrements distorting competition." This clearly suggests that both
vertical and horizontal agreements will be covered by the law.
Per se prohibitions are tempered  by the possibility for parties to such contracts to demand
an  exception of  the competent authority,  i.e.  the Ministry  for  Economiic Competition. The Act
distinguishes  between various forms of collusion for which an exception has been requested.  For an
exhaustive  list (embodied  in Art. 3(3)), an exception  is granted if the authority does not communicate  in
writing its disagreements  with the contract within two months (Art.3.4, 'special procedure').  The list
in Art. 3(3) consists of: (i) uniform application of conditions of trade; (ii) rationalization  of economic
5 This inrpreation  is dictated  by the  wording  in Art3(2).  Imicit,  ... , are in particular  contcs  or their pans
involving  (emphasis  added). The same  is true fOr  the list embodied  in Art. 85(1)  EEC.
36activity,  particularly  specialization  agreements;  (iii)  non-discriminatory  rebates  granted  to customers;  and
(iv) shares in supplying  th:  market if they are below a certain threshold.  For these categories  a
presumption  therefore  exists that an exception  should  be granted. Entrepreneurs  may also apply for
exceptior,  on grounds  other than  those in Art. 3(3).  In this case  (general  procedure),  the petitioner  has
to clarify  the reasons  in the application  and  to enclose  a draft  of the contract  in question. The November
1993  Amendment  removed  non-discriminatory  rebates  from Art. 3(3).
An exception  can be granted  if the restriction  of "economic  competition  ... is in the public
interest,"' with particular  attention  being  paid to the interests  of the consamers  (Art.5.2). Exemptions
are time-limited  and  cannot  have  retroactive  effect  (Art.5.4). For certain  types  of contracts  no exemption
can be granted. Art. 5(3) of the Act provides  an exhaustive  list which includes  exclusivity  contracts,
contracts  that violate  legal inhibition  on ethics of competition  or contracts  the scope  of which  obstructs
in a substantial  way  the economic  competition  in the market.
The Czech legislation  in this regard is therefore  similar to EU-antitrust  legislation  as it
combines  per se prohibitions  with the possibility  of specific  exemptions. In only a very few cases are
exemptions  not obtainable. Consequently,  the competent  authority enjoys a considerable  margin of
discretion. Even with respect  to those contracts  where no exemption  can be granted, the competent
authority  still has som,ie  leeway, as it must interpret  tenns.  The notion of "substantial  obstruction  of
economic  competition",  for example,  directly  defers  judgment  to the competent  authority  that will have
to estimate  to what extent  the proposed  obstruction  of economic  competition  is substantial. In applying
the law, the Ministry  of Economic  Competition  differentiates  between  horizontal  and  vertical  agreements.
It is gradually  introducing  criteria for the assessment  of horizontal  agreements,  using OECD  guidelines.
With  respect to mergers, the 1991 Act establishes  30 percent of total turnover in the
relevant  market  as the  threshold  above  which  mergers  are  presmned  to limit  economic  competition  in the
relevant  market (Art. 8(3)). All mergers  that exceed  the threshold  muLst  be notified  to the authority  for
approval;  such contracts  were void (illegal) wless approved  (Art. 8(4)).  Mergers were regarded  as
approved  if the authority  had not decided  within three months following  notification. The November
1993  amendment  no longer  makes  such  mergers  void by definition. Instead,  they  cannot  enter into force
untfil  approved. Under  the new  provisions,  the focus of the authorities  will be solely  on the economic
effect  of the merger,  not on the form of the agreement. In judging whether  a merger  that exceeds  the
threshold  should  be approved,  the authority  must determine  whether  the economic  advantages  brought
about  by the merger  outweigh  the negative  effects  created  by the restriction  of competition  (Art. 8(4)).
The wording  of the Act on this point further  supports  the view that the authority  enjoys  a considerable
amount  of discretion.
With respect to dominant55  positions the Act follows, to a large extent, the approach
adopted  in Act. 86  EEC: it is not the existence  or creation  of a dominant  position  that is sanctioned,  but
its the abuse  (Art. 9(3)). An indicative  list of examnples  of abuse  of dominant  position  (Art. 9(3))  draws
54  See Art 5(2) of the Act.
B According  to the Act dominant  positon exists where the entrepreneur  is not subject  to subsantial compedtion.
37substantially  from the list included  in Art. 86 EEC."6 The Act departs  on two points  from Art. 86 EEC:
first, it provides  a fixed threshold  above  which  an entrepreneur  is deemed  to be in a dominant  position:
a market  share  of at least  30% of supply  of identical,  comparable  or mutually  commutable  goods  of the
relevant  market  in the course  of the calendar  year (Art. 9(2)). No  such threshold  exists  in Art. 86 EEC.
Second,  entrepreneurs  who have  reached  this threshold,  including  by merger  are required  to report this
to the authority  without  delay (Art. 9(1)). The obligation  embodied  is one of notification  only, since it
is not the creation  but the abuse  of a dominant  position  that is of concern. The notification till help  the
authority  to better monitor the market behavior  of large entities  and determine  whether  or not abuse
occurs. The 1993  amendment  gives  the Ministry  the right to break  up dominant  firms or monopolies  if
such entities seriously  constrain  competition. A basic problem here is that a de facto obligation  is
imposed  on entrepreneurs  to monitor  their market  share. Such  an obligation  might prove to be difficult
to meet, especially  taken into account  that the relevant  markets  are not well defined.
Article 18 of the Czech  and Slovak law gives the authorities  the mandate  to comment  on
draft laws  and actions  of state administrative  and local bodies  that restrict  competition.
Procedural provisions
Originally  the Act  provided  for an office  of Economic  Competition  and for a Federal  Office
for Economic  Competition  dealing  with cases  that had a bearing  on the markets  of both the Czech  and
the Slovak  Republic  (Art. 10). After  the two Republics  decided  to abolish  the Federation,  the Office  of
the Czech  Republic  for Economic  Competition  is the sole competent  authority  to deal  with competition-
related  issues  in the Czech  Republic. Its jurisdiction  is circumscribed  in Art. 10. It has competence  'in
cases concerning  protection  against, limiting  or eliminating  competiton  which may have effects  na the
territory of the Czech Republic ...  "  This wording suggests that the 'effects'  doctrine constitutes the
basis of the Czech  jurisdiction. Art. 11  of the Act states  that the Office  is mainly  responsible  for tking
action against anti-competitive  behavior,  for approvig  mergers that are above the set threshold  and
collusive  agreements  where  the economic  benefits  offiet the costs of the restrictions  of competition.
The authority  has the competence  to impose  fines on entrepreneurs  for violating  the Act.
The 1993 amendment  strengthened  punitive  measures  against the abuse of a dominant  position, and
agreements  restricting  competition. The penalty for infringing  the law was raised from a maximum  of
5 percent of turnover for the last completed  year to a maximum  of ten percent of net tumover.  If
violators  profited from the breach  of obligation,  fines can amount  to the total profit gained  because  of
the breach (Art. 14).  All fines are to be imposed  within set time-limits. Proceedings  may be self-
initiated  or launched  upon request. All interested  parties have  the right to express  their views, and, if
need  be, oral hearings  can be organized. All decisions  of the authority  are subject  to appeal  before civil
courts within 30 days from the date  when the decision  was handed  to the party to the proceeding  (Art.
13). All employees  of the authority  are required to maintain  confidentiality  (Art.  16).
f  A fortion, al this is valid in cases  of monopoly  as well. Monopolies  are  not deemed  to be illegal; diey
should  not,  however,  abuse  their  power.
5Emphasis added.
38Last  but not least, as a transition  measure,  state administration  bodies  are required,  when
transferring  state  property  (privatization)  to guarantee  the elimination  of existing  monopolies  and/or to
disable  the creation  of new  monopolies  (Art. 19).
HtUNGARY
Act LXXXVI  of 1990  on the Prohibition  of Unfair Market  Practices  is the legislative
framework  dealing  with the protection  of free competition  in Hungary. This law was adopted  by the
Hungarian  Parliament  on November  20, 1990,  and entered into force on January  1, 1991. The basic
objective  of the Act is embodied  in the Preamble: "For the sake  of protecting  the freedom  and  priority
of economic  competition,  forms  of conduct  that are  contrary  to fair market  practices  must  be banned,  and
supervision  over the structural  merger of enterprises  must be introduced  by creating  the necessary
organizaton  forms".
The Act  addresses  forms  of collusion,  dominant  positions  terned economic  superiority  and
mergers. The "effects"  doctrine  is again  followed:  Paragraph  14 prohibits  forms of collusion  "which
would  result  in restriction  or exclusion  of econoniic  competition,  irrespective  of whether  the agreement
was concluded  on the territory  of the Hungarian  Republic  or not". The Act applies  to both goods  and
services,  with the exception  of banling, insurance  and security  markets.  The  approach  taken  by  the  otier
CEE countries  is, in principle,  also foliowed  here: a list of prohlbited  practices  is included,  with the
possibility  for participants  in such practices  to request  the conpetent authority  an exemption. The
Hungian  Act provides  a general  rule of what constitutes  a prohibited  practice  and gives  only a few
eamples of what form such practices  may take.  The general rule is that for practices  not to be
prohibited,  they should  not "result  in restriction  or exclusion  of economic  competition"  (para. 14). The
wide  wording  implies  that the authorities  entrusted  with the interpretation  of this paragraph  enjoy  wide
discretion.
The emples  given  in the Act  are the classic  ones  also  listed  in the other  competition  laws,
i.e., price-fixing,  market  segmentation,  limitation  of output,  etc.  (parh.  14). An  agreement  that  falls  under
the general  rule or the examples  given  in paragraph  14 is not  prohibited  if it is aimed  at "stopping  abuse
of economic  superiority"  or if it is of "minor  significance"  (Para. 15). The latter criterion  is further
explained  in paragraph  16: an agreement  is considered  to be of minor  significance  if on the market  in
question  the  joint shares  of the  participants  do not  exceed  10%. For the  market  in question  to be defined
(i.e. the relevant  market) die goods  that  form  the subject  of the agreement  (direcdy  competitive  but also
substitutable)  and the geographic  area have  to be taken into account  in accordance  with the defintion
provided  for in the same paragraph. Paragraph  17 provides  a second rationale  for exemption  from
prohibition  if:  "the concomitant  restriction  or exclusion  of economic  competition  does not exceed  the
measure  necessary  for  ating  economically  justifiable common  goals; and the concomitant  advantages
are greater  than  the concomitant  disadvantages."  Again,  the wording  leaves  ample  room  for discretion
when it comes  to its interpretation. On this point, however,  the Act gives  some indication  as to what
might  be a valid reason  justifying  the exemption  (concomitant  advantage)  and what might be a valid
reason  justifying  the prohibition  (concomitant  disadvantage).
As advantages  the legislation  considers the better prices that  aight result from the
implementation  of the agreement,  the better quality of the products, rationalized  production,  and
39technological  development.9  Conversely,  if the  joint shares  of the participants  to the agreement  exceed
30% of the relevant  market, it would  be considered  a disadvantage. The finding  of an advantage  or of
a disadvantage  by the competent  authority  does not automatically  lead  to exemption  or prohibition;  these
are rebuttable  presumptions. However,  the Act gives the legislator's  view as to which  agreements  are
considered  pro- and which  anti-competitive.
The Hungarian  Act prohibits abuse, not the creation of a dominant  position (economic
superiority). An indicative  list of what might constitute  an abuse of a doninant position includes
unjustified  refusal  to conclude  contracts  and  erection  of barriers  to entry (Art.20). The Act also  provides
an indicative  list of what might constitute  a dominant  position:  a share  that exceeds  30% in the relevant
market  (50  % if it is  joint shares  of three  entrepreneurs),  or a situation  where  the merchandise  of  an entity
cannot  be procured  elsewhere  (Para.21).
Parties  that want to merge  are  jointly  under  the obligation  to notify  the competent  authority
in order for ihe latter  to grant an authorization  if: the joint share of the participants  on a given  market
as regards  any  goods  sold  by them in the previous  calendar  year  exceeds  30 per cent; or the  joint returns
on sales of the participants  in the previous  calendar  year exceeded  10 billion forints" (Para.21). In
principle,  any merger  that hampers  competition  will not be authorized  (Paragraph  24.1).  However,  a
merger  can  be exempted,  notwithstanding  paragraph  24.1, if (a) the advantages  of economic  competition
outweigh  the disadvantages;  (b) economic  competition  as regards  the larger  part of the goods  in question
is not ruled out; or (c) it promotes  transactions  on foreign  markets which are advantageous  from the
viewpoint  of national  economy.'
ragraph  60 of the law  requires  ministers  to consult  the competition  office  on all draft  laws
that'seek  to limit  competition.
Procedurl  Provisions
The Office of Economic Competition  is  the competent authority entrusted with the
responsibility  to supervise  competition  as regulated  in the Act  (Paragraph  52). It is headed  by a President
and two vice-presidents  who  are appointed  for six years  by the President  of the Republic  at the proposal
of the prime minister (paragraph 53).  Their mandate is terminated after 6 years, or following  a
resignation,  death or dismissal. As to the latter, the only case where a subjective  judgement  by the
supervising  authority  is required  for a dismissal  concerns  the case where "they  become  unfit  for their
office on a lastingtbasis"  (Para.  54).
The Office is responsible  for prosecuting  violators of the Act, but also for granting
exemptions. Proceedings  may be launched  at the request  at the interested  party or ex officio.  (Paragraph
33)  Strict time-limits  are imposed  within which the Office  has to make a ruling; transparency  of the
process is also guaranteed  through  hearings (Paragraph  34 f).  In discharging  its responsibilities,  the
Office may impose fines that are directly connected  to the material  advantage  attained  through the
unlawful  conduct; these can vary between  30% and 200% of such an advantage  (paragraphs  43, 48).
A These  reasons  are  provided  in paragraph  17(2).  The  list is indicative;  Paragraph  17(2)  stipulates  from  the
aspect  of exemption  from prohibition  is especially qualifies" (emphasis  added).
"9  See  paragraph  24(2).
40Only in exceptional  circumstances  can the 30% threshold  be violated.  All rulings of the Office are
appealable  before  the courts  within 30 days from delivery  of the ruling passed  on the matter (paragraph
41).
Because  of "the drastic restructuring  of its economy,  and its trial-and-error  approach  to
competition  law, the Hungarian  government  plans to submit  draft changes  to the 1990 statute to the
Parliament  during  the summer  of 1994."60
POLAND
The Polish  competition  law is embodied  in the Act of February  24, 1990  on counteracting
monopolistic  practices, as amended  by the Act of  June 28, .1991.  The objective  of the Act is to
counteract  "monopolistic  practices  of economic  entities  and  their combinations  that have  an effect  within
the territory  of the Republic  of Poland".61  The 'effects doctrine'  is therefore  espoused. The Act covers
both the goods and the services  markets.
The Act distinguishes  between "monopolistic  practices"  and mergers.  The first are, in
principle,  prohibited.  The creation  of dominant  position  or of a monopoly  is not  prohibited  per se; what
is prohibited  is its abuse. Art. 7, for example  prohibits "economic  entities  in a monopolistic  position"
from engaging  in price-fixing  or from charging  "excessively  exorbitant". the creation  of a monopolistic
position is not prohibited  through;  the Act, however, makes it difficult for entities to acquire a
monopolistic  position, mainly by prohibiting, in principle, "monopolistic  practices".  The abuse of
dominant  position is considered to be a  'monopolistic practice," although  the term "monopolistic
practices"  is not defined,  but covers  forms of collusion  comparable  to those  covered,  for example  in Art.
85(1)  EEC (with  the notable  addition  of the abuse  of dominant  position). The "monopolistic  practices"
include, inter alia, price-fixing,  market segmentation,  and imposition  of barriers to entry or onerous
contract  terms yielding  undue  economic  benefits  to the imposing  entity.  The wording of a least two
articles  of the Act  suggests  the list of monopolistic  practices  embodied  in the Act is exhaustive.  Arts.
4, 5, 7 and 9 are the only articles  in the Act covering  this subject  area.  Leaving  Art. 9 aside-since it
deals with a very specific  issue (see below)-a decision  by the competent  authority  can be taken with
respect  to the "monopolistic  practices"  specified  in the other three  articles. While  the wording  is wide,
making  the list exhaustive  is unlikely  to prove effective.
If there is a finding  that  monopolistic  practices  have  occurred,  the competent  authority  will
issue  a decision  ordering  their  termination  and determining  the conditions  of the termination  (Arts. 6 and
8).  Such  practices  however,  can be exempted  from prohibition  if the following  two conditions  are met:
(i) they  are necessary  to conduct  an economic  activity; and (ii) they  do not result in a significant  restrint
Declaration  by the  Head of Hungary's  Office  of Economic  Competition,  March 19, 1993,  BNA  Antit  anad
Trade  Regulton  Riport, No. 1607, March  25, L993,  p. 330.
fi See Art. 1 of the Act.
'Art.  6 stipulates  "The  monopolistic  practices  specified  in articles  4 and 5 are prohibited";  Art. 8 furdt
stipulatcs  "if there is a finding  that the monopolistic  practices  suecifled  in articles  4. 5 and 7 have occurred...-
(emphasis added).
41of competition  (Art. 6). The burden  of proof in this case  lies with the party  that is claiming  the existence
of both conditions.
As already stated, abuse of dominant position is considered  a prohibited  monopolistic
practice. Dominance  is defined  'as the position  of an economic  entity  if it does not  encounter  significant
competition  in a national  or local  market; it is presumed  that an economic  entity  has a dominant  position
if its share exceeds  40 percent' (Arts. 2, 7).  An indicative  list of abuses of dominant position is
provided, including  price-fixing,  market segmentation,  and refusal  to sell (Art. 5).  Since abuse of
doninamn  position  is considered  to come  under  'monopolistic  practices', it is prohibited  unless  specifically
exempted  by the competent  authority.
Art. 9 deals  specifically  with two practices:  specialization  contracts  and  joint sales  or joint
purchases  of commodities.  The competent  authority  is to issue  a decision  prohibiting  such agreements,
if they imply a significant  restraint of competition and yield no economic  benefits to the participants (e.g.,
a significant  reduction  in production  or sales  costs or improvement  of the quality  of products).
Mergers  and 'transformations'  are treated  separately  in the Act.  There is an obligation  to
notify  mergers  if they  lead  to a dominant  position  on the relevant  market,  or if any of the merging  entities
already had a dominant  position. The competent  authority  must decide whether  the merger will be
allowed  to go ahead within two  months of notification  (Art.  11).
Procedural provisions
The Act establishes  two bodies (of different  hierarchical  order)  that deal exclusively  with
competition  related  issues:  the Antimonopoly  Office  and the Antimonopoly  Court. The Antimonopoly
Office  is headed  by a President  who  is appointed  and recalled  by the Prime  Minister. The President  has
extensive  powers  in organizing  the structure  of the Office  (e.g., by establishing  regional  offices)  (Arts.
17-18),  and attends  meetings  of the Council  of Ministers.
The Antimonopoly  Office  decides  whether  certainpractices  constitute  monopolistic  practices,
whether  they should  be exempted  and whether  entities  should  be allowed  to merge  notwithstanding  that
their resulting  market  share will exceed  the threshold. The Office  is entrusted  with substantial  powers.
It has the authority  to require  the cessation  of the monopolistic  practice  and  the conditions  thereof  (Art.
8).  In doing  so, the Office may  order th- violiting entities  to pay fines.: Fines can amount  to 15  % of
the after tax eamings of the entity in the preceding  fiscal year.  Fines may also be imposed  in case
economic  entities  fail to execute  decisions  of the Office  (Art. 15). Firms with a dominant  position  may
be broken up if they permanently  restrain competition. While the office may object to proposed
transformations  of firms, it does not have the power to prescribe a particular form of division in
transformation  cases  (Fornalczyk,  1993,  p. 36).
All decisions  of the Antimonopoly  Office  may  be appealed  within  two weeks  from the day
of the receipt  of the decision  to the Antimonopoly  Court. This  Court  deals  exclusively  with  antimonopoly
cases  (Art. 27). The  procedures  followed  before  this  Court are  those  of the  Polish  Civil Procedure  Code.
42SLOVAK  REPUBLIC6"
At the time of writing  the Slovalc  Republic  applies  the 1991  Czech  and Slovak  Federal  law
on competition  (the Competition  Protection  Act),  discussed  in the section  on the Czech  Republic  above.
A draft  law amending  the Federal  Act was discussed  in Parliament  in January 1994,  but was not passed
due to political  developments.  The new  Govermnent  re-subnitted the draft law to Parliament,  which  is
expected  to consider  the proposed  legislation  by mid-1994. Until the draft law is adopted,  the 1991
Federal  applies.
The draft law makes safeguarding  national  welfare  the ultimate  goal of the competition
authorities. This is to be achieved  by controlling  the abuse of economic  power by dominant  firms.
Agreements  restricting  competition  are prohibited  if they  have as object  or effect  restriction  of effective
competition  (where  'effective' is to be interpreted  as allowing  the market  to be contestable).  This is an
important  distinction  with  the Federal  1991  law, which  makes  all restraints  illicit  unless  they  are  approved
or exempted  by the competition  authority  because  they  advantages  for the economy  offset  any costs. The
concept  of protection  of effective  competition  found  in the draft law implies  that only those restrictions
which  harm consumer  welfare are prohibited. The test of balance  between  harm to competition  and
economic  efficiency  advantages  will be used  when  evaluating  restrictive  agreemen.  It is expected  that
the law will prohibit  an exhaustive  list of horizontal  agreements  on a per se basis. However,  enterprises
will  have  the opportunity  to argue  that an agreement  fulfills  the  conditions  for being  granted  an automatic
exemption  (the  wording  in this conmection  is the same  as is found in Art. 85(3)  of the Treaty of Rome).
A new defiition of dominant  position  in a relevant  market is contained  in the draft law.  Two criteria
are proposed:  (1) the firm is not subject  of substantial  competition;  or (2) the firm has economic  power
which  allows  it to behave  independently  in the market  and it is able restrict  competition.  Aprimafacie
presumption  of dominance  is established  if a finm  has a share of 40 per cent or more of the relevant
market.  The objective  underlying  the provisions  on abuse of dominant  positions is also to control
economic  power  of the dominant  firm.
The rules regarding  concentrations  (mergers)  are very similar  to the provisions  of the 1989
EC Merger Control  Regulatiou. The draft law sets two thresholds-SKK  300  million  total turnover  of
the participants,  or a 20 per cent  market  share  in the relevant  product  market in the territory  of Slovakia
(the latter applies for certain industries where tumover is  difficult to  calculate).  Mergers or
concentrations  above  the  threshold  are subject  to preventive  control. The entry  into force  of an agreement
is suspended  during one month after its notification  to the authorities. A criterion for determining
whether  te  merger  is acceptable  is the balance  between  harm to competition-creation  or stengtheing
of a dominant  position  in the market-and its economic  advantages.
Both  the existng Czech  and  Slovak  law  (1991)  and  the draft  legislation  contains  a provision
(Art. 18)  mandating  the Antimonopoly  Office  to analyze  actions  of state  administrtive and local  bodies
having  impact  on competition  (including  state  aid measures)  and  may  require  these  bodies  to take  remedial
action. The Antimonopoly  Office  is also involved  in the privatization  process. It is required  to provide
comments  on privanzation  plans with a view to ensuring  the appropriate  de-concentation  of the state
enterprises with a dominant position in the market.  However, in such cases the Office has only an
advisory role.
43  What  follows  draws  on conespondence  with Milan  Banns.
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